Volume 7 Issue 1 (Spring 2011) by unknown
The Modern American
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 1
2011
Volume 7 Issue 1 (Spring 2011)
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma
This Entire Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Modern American by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
(2011) "Volume 7 Issue 1 (Spring 2011)," The Modern American: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma/vol7/iss1/1
Volume 7 Issue 1 (Spring 2011)
This entire issue is available in The Modern American: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma/vol7/iss1/1
TM
Volume 7 - Issue 1 Spring  2011
A Publication Dedicated to Diversity and the Law
THE MODERN AMERICAN
Is a Second Mommy a Good 
Enough Second Parent?: Why 
Voluntary Acknowledgments of 
Paternity Should be Available to 
Lesbian Co-Parents
Julia Saladino
Legal Impediments Facing 
Nonimmigrants Entering 
Licensed Professions
Justin Storch
The Emerging Trend of 
Extending ADA Reasonable 
Accommodation beyond 
the Workplace to Include 
Commuting Issues: A comment 
on Colwell v. Rite Aid
Frederick J. Melkey
Race and Immigration Law: 
A Troubling Marriage
Lisa Sandoval
Book Review: Brock Thompson’s 
The Un–Natural State: Arkansas 
and the Queer South
Katy Bosse
Conference Highlights: 
Refl ections of a Law Student 
from the Hip Hop Generation
Shailee Diwanji
Symposium Highlights: 
What, Exactly, Is a 
“Post-White” America?
M. Coleen Wilson
Staff
Executive Board
Editor-in-Chief
Michele-Ann Wilson
Executive Editor
Keyla Bade
Senior Managing Editor
Alex Diaz-Ferguson
Senior Articles Editor
Rachel Zoghlin
Senior Marketing Editor
Alexandra Manrique
Senior Staff Editor
Leslie Morris
__________________
Symposium Editor
John Rogos
Articles Editors
Brian Aragon, Elliot Kennedy, Amer Raja, Paul Schuh
Staff Writers
Kathryn Bosse, Ashly Hinmon, Beiah Mejia, Justin Storch
Junior Staff
Shailee Diwanji, April Fuller, Danielle Hart, Bret Mooney, 
David Wexelblat, Leah Wissow
Assistant Managing Editors
Ruth Obaseki, Rachel Fisher
Blog Contributors
Zannie Carlson, Shailee Diwanji
Faculty Advisors
Lia Epperson
Sherry Weaver
Cover Art
Neil Ransom
In this issue The Modern American features a broad spectrum 
of  stimulating articles that continue The Modern American’s goal 
of  fostering the discourse on diversity.
As The Modern American’s readership base continues to ex-
pand, the Volume 7 Executive Board would like to thank the 
Volume 6 leaders who, through the Strategic Plan Initiative, in-
creased The Modern American’s digital presence. As always, sub-
scribers may access The Modern American via LexisNexis, Hei-
nOnline, and Westlaw databases. Now subscribers may interact 
with The Modern American on our blog, Modern America, and 
access various resources on our Digital Commons website.  The 
Digital Commons platform allows readers to access the current 
issue, archived issues, and also acts as a submission repository 
for authors. This digital expansion ushered in a new era for The 
Modern American, and the Volume 7 board hopes subscribers will 
continue to patronize these new digital platforms and enrich the 
community experience.
Modern America: The Modern American’s Law & Politics Blog, 
www.wclmodernamerican.blogspot.com.
The Modern American @ the Digital Commons, 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma/.
                                                    
                                                          Sincerely Yours, 
    The Executive Board
   The Modern American 
Letter from the Executive Board
THE MODERN AMERICAN
SPRING 2011 1
TABLE	OF	CONTENTS
 2 | Is	a	Second	Mommy	a	
Good	Enough	Second	
Parent?:	Why	Voluntary	
Acknowledgments	of	
Paternity	Should	be	
Available	to	Lesbian	
Co-Parents
Julia Saladino
 12 | Legal	Impediments	Facing	
Nonimmigrants	Entering	
Licensed	Professions
Justin Storch
 22 | The	Emerging	Trend	of	
Extending	ADA	Reasonable	
Accommodation	beyond	
the	Workplace	to	Include	
Commuting	Issues:	A	
comment	on	Colwell v. 
Rite Aid
Frederick J. Melkey
 42 | Race	and	Immigration	Law:	
A	Troubling	Marriage
Lisa Sandoval
 59 | Book	Review:	
Brock	Thompson’s	
The Un–Natural State: 
Arkansas and the 
Queer South
Katy Bosse
 64 | Conference	Highlights:	
Refl	ections	of	a	Law	
Student	from	the	Hip	
Hop	Generation
Shailee Diwanji
 65 | Symposium	Highlights:	
What,	Exactly,	Is	a	
“Post-White”	America?
M. Coleen Wilson
THE MODERN AMERICAN2
IS	A	SECOND	MOMMY	A	GOOD	ENOUGH	SECOND	
PARENT?:	WHY	VOLUNTARY	ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	
OF	PATERNITY	SHOULD	BE	AVAILABLE	
TO	LESBIAN	CO-PARENTS
By Julia Saladino1
I.	 Introduction
Janet Jenkins simply wants to see her 
daughter. Jenkins and her former partner, Lisa 
Miller, jointly agreed to parent a child together after 
obtaining a civil union in Vermont.2 Miller completed 
artifi cial insemination with the consent and support 
of  Jenkins. After Miller gave birth in Virginia to 
the couple’s daughter, Isabella, the two women 
cohabitated and co-parented in Virginia before 
separating.3 Because Miller is the biological mother 
of  Isabella, she fervently tried to deny parental rights 
to Jenkins after their separation. The case gained 
considerable attention, and Miller fi led custody 
disputes in both Virginia and Vermont. Ultimately, 
Virginia’s Supreme Court held that the Vermont 
courts have jurisdiction, and Vermont’s Supreme 
Court determined that Jenkins did in fact have 
parental rights.4 Virginia, therefore, could not modify 
the custody order. Even today, Miller continues to 
appeal the case and objects to sharing physical custody 
with Jenkins.5 Jenkins’ case is not particularly unique. 
Same-sex parents all over the country face custody 
disputes after separating.6 Often the biological parent 
claims full parental authority, and if  the parents live in 
a state where same-sex marriages or civil unions are 
not recognized, the non-biological parent may be left 
with limited resources.7
These custody cases raise the family law issue 
of  what constitutes a parent. If  both parties agree 
to co-parent, what makes one parent more entitled 
to parenting rights than the other? Does biology 
dictate parenting rights when the couple has a pre-
established agreement to co-parent? In states where 
second parent adoption is incredibly diffi cult or not 
available, non-biological parents have limited options 
to gain legal parentage over their children.8 This 
paper argues that alternative avenues for parental 
rights, specifi cally Voluntary Acknowledgements of  
Paternity (VAP) which allow the parties to establish 
parentage by signing an affi davit shortly after the 
child’s birth, should be available to lesbian co-parents. 
I further argue that VAPs are appropriate devices to 
establish consensual parentage rights at a child’s birth 
and that making these forms available to lesbian co-
parents satisfi es the equal protection clause of  the 
Constitution and meets Congress’ original policy 
considerations in developing the federal VAP statute.
II.	 Background
The VAP process is a simplifi ed 
administrative procedure that allows the government 
to easily identify parents in the absence of  a marital 
presumption of  parentage.9 One of  Congress’ 
original policy concerns for adopting VAP statutes 
in the 1990s was to facilitate the collection of  child 
support funds.10 In order to put a simplifi ed procedure 
in place, Congress created a federal child support 
enforcement statute, Title IV-D.11 To receive federal 
funding, Congress requires each state to establish 
informal procedures for establishing paternity.12
Consequently, each state has a VAP statute in place 
to easily facilitate this process without requiring the 
involvement of  the judicial system every time an 
unwed mother gives birth.13
An additional Congressional consideration 
when promoting the VAP process is to encourage 
the establishment of  legal parentage as early in a 
child’s life as possible. Because our legal system 
recognizes two parents for children, the VAP process 
is attractive and allows this determination to be 
made with judicial ease.14 The legal determination 
of  parentage additionally follows the child and her 
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parents throughout the country. Because a VAP is 
treated as a court order, states view a VAP granted 
in another state with full faith and credit, eliminating 
the need to litigate parentage when a parent moves 
across state lines.15 Not all findings of  parentage are 
afforded full faith and credit however.16 States are 
allowed to refuse to grant full faith and credit to other 
state’s statutes, so accordingly, a finding of  parentage 
based on a statute will not clearly always be afforded 
full faith and credit outside that state.17
Court orders, unlike findings of  parentage 
based on a statute, have portability and are generally 
granted full faith and credit.18 Since VAPs are treated 
as judicial determinations, states should grant these 
parentage determinations full faith and credit. This 
full faith and credit aspect of  the VAP process affords 
greater administrative ease to the judicial system 
and protects individual parental rights.19 Because 
lesbian co-parents who cannot access second parent 
adoptions need some form of  legal protection that 
transfers across state lines, access to the VAP process 
could have significant and critical implications for 
lesbian co-parents’ parental rights.
The VAP procedure consists of  a hospital-
based program where an unmarried couple has 
the option of  signing an affidavit voluntarily 
acknowledging paternity immediately before or after 
the child’s birth. Some state VAP forms require that 
the affidavits state that the parents have some reason 
to believe that the male is the biological father.20 
Additionally, VAPs serve as a judicial determination 
of  parentage and are very difficult to challenge later 
in the child’s life. Typically, once both parents sign 
a VAP, a court will overturn the determination of  
parentage only if  the male parent signed due to a 
mother’s representation that amounts to fraud.21
In Andrew R. v. Arizona Dept. of  Economic 
Security, Andrew and Mother signed a VAP after 
the birth of  Isabella.22 Another man claiming 
paternity over Isabella challenged the voluntary 
acknowledgement of  paternity. The court 
determined that because Andrew R. and Isabella’s 
mother signed the VAP, a judicial determination of  
parentage stands despite evidence that another man 
is Isabella’s actual biological father, and Andrew was 
financially responsible for Isabella. The court noted 
that after properly executed, a VAP in Arizona stands 
unless challenged within 60 days on the basis of  
fraud or duress. This case demonstrates the relative 
difficulty of  dismissing a validly executed VAP after a 
reasonable time period.
Although the state is often eager to find a 
second parent to support a child to avoid financial 
burden on the government, Andrew R. articulates 
the burden an individual faces when challenging an 
acknowledgement of  paternity.23 Often, unless the 
challenging party can prove fraud, duress, or material 
mistake of  fact, the finding of  parentage established 
through a VAP stands.24 Additionally, in cases where 
the child’s education and or custody is at issue, 
rather than challenging child support orders, courts 
will honor VAPs, even in the absence of  a father’s 
biological tie to the child.25 These cases demonstrate 
that VAPs are difficult to overturn, and that a party 
challenging parentage based on a VAP faces a high 
burden.26 Cases where judges have overturned 
parentage determinations often contain some finding 
of  duress or fraud.27
Historically, the VAP process has been closed 
off  to lesbian co-parents. In states that model their 
VAP statute on the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) 
and require the non-biological parent to attest to a 
belief  of  biological parenthood, lesbian co-parents 
are unable to meet this requirement.28 The UPA is 
not a desirable model for state VAP statutes because 
its gender specific language forecloses the VAP 
procedure for lesbian couples.29 Federal legislation 
does not have this requirement, and the male parent 
signing the VAP is not compelled to attest to being 
the biological father.30 If  a state limits access to VAPs 
to situations where both parents have a reason to 
believe the father signing the affidavit is the biological 
father, they are not made available to a lesbian partner. 
Lesbian partners cannot claim biological parentage 
when her partner is the biological parent.31 However, 
case law demonstrates that even when parents sign 
a VAP with knowledge that the listed father is not 
the child’s biological father, the VAP will be still be 
honored.32 The father’s false affidavit typically does 
not constitute fraud or coercion because even though 
the man knows he is not the biological father, he still 
signs the VAP to demonstrate his agreement to co-
parent.33
Accordingly, state legislatures should not 
follow the UPA model and should instead allow two 
adults to consent to parentage immediately before 
or after the child’s birth, regardless of  biological 
parenthood. Additionally, I argue that when two 
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lesbians make the decision to co-parent, the non-
biological parent should have the same ability to 
establish parentage as a similarly situated male so as 
not to violate equal protection. Finally, access to VAPs 
for both heterosexual and lesbian parents furthers 
Congress’ policy considerations of  establishing 
parentage early in a child’s life and ensuring that 
children have two parents responsible for their needs, 
and therefore lesbian co-parents should have an 
option to sign a VAP.34
III.	Analysis
A. Voluntary Acknowledgements of  Paternity are 
appropriate for use within lesbian parenting units 
because courts do not always rely on biology to 
determine  parentage.
VAPs are an appropriate method of  
establishing parentage of  a lesbian partner because 
courts uphold VAPs even in instances where the 
father signs the affidavit with knowledge that he is 
not the biological father.35 Under the federal statute 
governing VAPs, a man may voluntarily acknowledge 
his paternity as long as the mother consents.36 
Federal law does not require genetic testing before 
a man has access to the VAP process, indicating that 
the “acknowledged father” may not always be the 
biological father.37 Similarly, if  a non-biological lesbian 
partner wishes to acknowledge parentage and the 
biological mother consents, federal and state statutes 
should allow the couple to utilize the VAP procedure 
to legally establish parentage. In some states, under 
the current VAP process, a man acknowledging 
paternity must attest that he believes himself  to be 
the biological father.38 However, in practice, a man 
can use the system to establish parentage even with 
the knowledge that he is not the biological father.39 
Because VAPs are extremely difficult to overturn, 
a heterosexual couple can essentially consent to 
parentage and bypass the judicial process, while 
lesbian couples are not allowed the same convenience.
One argument against allowing homosexual 
couples access to the VAP process is that these 
couples may circumvent adoption by doing so. A 
lesbian co-parent that signs a VAP, however, is not 
circumventing second-parent adoption any more so 
than a heterosexual male co-parent accessing the VAP 
process. Both the female and the male co-parent are 
establishing parentage without first proving a genetic 
tie to the child or completing the adoption procedure. 
Adoptions are intended to terminate one party’s legal 
parental rights and grant those rights to another party 
or in the case of  second-parent adoption, establish 
a second parent’s parental rights.40 In an Ohio case, 
the court determined that a gestational surrogacy 
agreement rebutted a presumption of  parentage 
when the birth mother did not want to abide by the 
surrogacy contract.41 This situation is a more accurate 
example of  circumventing adoption.
In this case, the appellee, an unmarried 
woman, contacted an Ohio clinic to find anonymous 
sperm and egg donors and a surrogate in order to 
fulfill a gestational surrogate pregnancy.  The clinic 
located the appellant surrogate and the two women 
along with the appellee’s fiancé entered into a 
surrogacy agreement naming the appellee as the 
intended mother and the appellant as the surrogate. 
According to the contract all parental rights and 
responsibilities belonged to the appellee, and the 
appellant agreed to relinquish all rights.  When the 
appellant challenged the surrogacy agreement and 
tried to establish herself  as the child’s legal mother, 
the appellate court determined that the surrogacy 
agreement trumped the birth mother’s rights.42 The 
judge relied on Ohio’s Parentage Act and reasoned that 
“appellee’s voluntary acknowledgment of  maternity 
is sufficient to rebut the presumption that appellant 
is the child’s natural mother by reason of  her having 
given birth to the child.”43 This Ohio case, however, 
is not representative of  how the VAP process should 
operate for lesbian couples, where in most cases the 
lesbian co-parent would be establishing parentage of  
her partner’s biological or birth child. Additionally, 
because many states do not grant second parent 
adoptions for same-sex co-parents, lesbian couples 
may be in even more dire need for the VAP process 
than heterosexual couples.44
In Chicago, Illinois a judge upheld a 
VAP despite contradictory biological evidence. A 
heterosexual couple that had dated in the past but 
never married agreed to sign a VAP when Torres gave 
birth in 2001.45 Torres tried to extinguish Huddleston’s 
paternity despite the fact that Huddleston had acted 
as a parent for two years, playing with the child, 
changing diapers, and contributing to the child’s 
financial needs. The Domestic Relations Judge 
determined that the parties exhibited a clear and 
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unambiguous intent to name Huddleston as father 
of  the child. Because both parties contributed to 
the misrepresentation, the fact that the affidavit 
was improperly signed was immaterial to the case. 
Huddleston, though not the biological father, was 
determined to have legal rights to the child.46 The 
judge strongly considered Huddleston’s active role in 
the child’s life for the preceding two years. The judge 
reasoned that “both parties are participants in what 
the court views as their clear, unambiguous intent 
to denominate Mr. Huddleston as the parent of  this 
child,” and therefore the VAP must remain valid.47
A lesbian non-biological parent who intends 
to act as a child’s parent should have the option of  
legally establishing paternity through the use of  a 
VAP. If  biology is not the determinative factor for 
heterosexual couples that utilize the VAP process, 
then biology alone should not bar a same-sex, non-
biological parent from accessing the VAP procedure.48 
Even though the VAP system in some states is 
premised on biological considerations, in practice, 
a finding contrary to an attestation of  biological 
parenthood often does not void a VAP. As a result, 
lesbian non-biological parents should have the same 
access as heterosexual male parents.
The Supreme Court has also suggested that 
biology is not the determinative factor in establishing 
parentage. The Court held that the law does not 
recognize the rights of  biological parents claiming a 
relationship to a child when a marital parental unit 
exists. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., Michael sought 
recognition as a dual father for a child born to a 
woman with whom he was previously engaged in an 
affair.49 Because the mother was married to Gerald at 
the time of  the child’s birth, Gerald had parental rights 
because of  California’s marital presumption.50 Even 
though Michael maintained a parental relationship 
with the child, Justice Scalia held that Michael’s 
relationship with his daughter is not “an interest 
traditionally protected by our society.”51 Michael, 
therefore, was legally barred from being the child’s 
father. While this case stands for the proposition of  
privileging parental rights in marital relationships, 
Michael H. also demonstrates that biology alone is 
not the determinative factor granting custody. The 
holding in Michael H. opposes a functional parenting 
framework but still supports the proposition that 
biology is not the ultimate threshold for parental 
rights.52 Accordingly, the law should allow lesbian, 
non-biological parents parental rights even despite 
the absence of  a biological connection to the child.
Because biology is not determinative of  the 
validity of  a VAP, states should eliminate the affidavit 
of  “believed biology” in their VAP statutes and 
forms and instead adopt an affidavit that establishes 
the signing parent expects and consents to act as 
a parent to the child assuming all the rights and 
responsibilities that accompany parentage. Parentage 
should reflect a functional parenting framework 
rather than a biological parenthood requirement. 
Functional parenthood applies when a person acts as 
a parent without being a child’s biological parent. A 
person who has a relationship with the child, cares 
for the child, and supports the child while not having 
a biological relationship to the child is an example of  
a functional parent.53
As familial make-ups in society continue to 
change and expand, legislatures and judges are more 
willing to define, create, and interpret family law in 
ways that do not only consider biology.54 Courts 
that are willing to liberally interpret the definition of  
parenthood and family have increasingly looked to 
what is in the child’s best interests when paternity is 
challenged.55 For example, a father who has acted as a 
child’s parent and then finds genetic proof  that he is 
not the father may still have parental responsibilities 
to that child.56 If  a court finds that the father has 
sufficiently acted as a parent and established a 
continued relationship with the child, then the court 
may determine that maintaining that parent-child 
relationship is in the best interests of  the child. 
Instead of  relying primarily on biology, judges should 
be more willing to consider the functional parenting 
of  the parent and make a determination that prefers 
relationships to genetics.
B. Denying Voluntary Acknowledgements of  
Paternity to a non-biological parent in a lesbian 
couple unconstitutionally discriminates on the 
basis of  gender and therefore violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of  the Fourteenth Amendment.
Denying a non-biological lesbian partner the 
option of  signing a VAP violates equal protection 
because similarly situated male, heterosexual parents 
are allowed to sign a VAP and the discrimination is 
not substantially related to the important government 
interest. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
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States Constitution provides that “no state shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of  the laws.”57 Because a male that is not a 
child’s biological father is able to sign a VAP without 
first genetically establishing paternity, a similarly 
situated female must have the same opportunity. 
Therefore, a non-biological lesbian parent who 
wants to establish paternity through a VAP must be 
afforded that option in order for a state’s VAP statute 
to satisfy equal protection.
Laws that differentiate based on the parent’s 
gender will not survive equal protection challenges 
unless the laws satisfy intermediate scrutiny.58 To 
stand, the law must serve an important government 
interest and the law must be substantially related to 
that interest.59 In cases where states create parenting 
statutes that differentiate based on gender, the 
Supreme Court may invalidate those statutes if  
they do not satisfy intermediate scrutiny. In Caban 
v. Mohammed, a New York law gave mothers the 
absolute right to consent to adoption.60 Caban, 
the father, and Mohammed, the mother, had two 
children together but never married. After the 
couple separated, Caban petitioned for adoption of  
the children, and Mohammed cross-petitioned. The 
court granted Mohammed custody based on the 
New York Domestic Relations statute that allows 
an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block 
their child’s adoption by withholding her consent. The 
Supreme Court held that the sex-based distinction 
between unwed mothers and unwed fathers in the 
New York statute violated the equal protection clause 
of  the Fourteenth Amendment because it bore no 
substantial relation to any important state interest.61
Similarly, in Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme 
Court struck down an Illinois statute that made 
children of  unwed parents wards of  the State upon 
their mothers’ death.62 Stanley, a biological and 
functional parent for his four children, challenged the 
law when the state placed his children in the care of  
court appointed guardians after their mother died. 
Stanley’s parental rights were effectively terminated, 
despite other statutory provisions that required a 
showing of  unfitness to terminate parental rights.63 
Because the court never proved that Stanley was an 
unfit parent, rather, it discriminated against him on 
the basis of  his status as an unwed-father, Stanley 
argued that the state statute violated the equal 
protection clause. The Court held that the Illinois 
law violated equal protection because removing a 
child from an unwed father after the mother’s death, 
when the father had an existing relationship with the 
children, did not further the state’s interest of  having 
children cared for by fit parents.64
Based on the holdings in Caban and Stanley, 
state legislatures should create VAP statutes that 
refuse to differentiate on the basis of  gender. VAP 
statutes that preference male parents over female 
parents violate equal protection if  they do not 
meet intermediate scrutiny because the gender 
distinction is not substantially related to an important 
government interest. If  the government’s interest is 
administrative ease and establishing parentage early 
in a child’s life when an unwed mother gives birth, a 
VAP statute that only allows male parents to establish 
parentage is not substantially related to that interest. 
Such a statute would likely meet rational basis review 
but is under-inclusive and fails to satisfy the higher 
level of  scrutiny required when analyzing laws that 
discriminate on the basis of  gender. However, when 
a lesbian mother is impregnated and gives birth by 
means of  artificial insemination, there is likely no 
male that will claim parentage at the child’s birth. 
There could, however, be a female co-parent who 
wants to establish parentage. As both a legal and 
policy matter, VAP statutes should not deny access to 
female co-parents.
In Nguyen v. INS, however, Nguyen challenged 
the constitutionality of  8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).65 This 
section of  the U.S. Code governs the acquisition 
of  U.S. citizenship of  a child born to unmarried 
parents when only one parent is a U.S. citizen. The 
statute has different requirements for granting a child 
citizenship depending on whether the citizen parent 
is the mother or the father; the law makes it much 
more difficult for a citizen father to confer his U.S. 
citizenship to his child. The Supreme Court held that 
the statute survived intermediate scrutiny because 
although it involved classifications based on gender 
– raising the burden of  the father above the burden 
of  the mother – the law also achieved important 
government objectives of  ensuring that the father 
is biologically related to the child and that the child 
and parent have everyday ties.66 There is no need for 
the statute to impose these additional requirements 
on the mother because she necessarily will be with 
the child at birth and is guaranteed an opportunity 
to establish a relationship with the child. Nguyen, 
SPRING 2011 7
therefore, provides an example of  where the Court 
held that a gender-based parentage classification 
did not violate the equal protection clause of  the 
Constitution and that a priority for biological ties is 
an important state interest.67
Still, Nguyen does not unequivocally support 
gender-based classifications based on biology. In the 
VAP situation, both a father and a lesbian co-parent 
both have the potential to lack biological ties to 
the child. Signing a VAP affirms that the co-parent 
agrees to accept parental rights and responsibilities 
associated with the child, regardless of  biology. The 
need to establish and promote biological ties is not 
furthered by excluding a co-parent when a biological 
mother is unmarried and consents to sharing parental 
rights with another parent.
Although Nguyen does establish that a gender-
based classification in parentage determinations is 
acceptable to uphold certain governmental interests, 
the VAP process does not reflect one of  those 
instances where a distinction is justified. In support 
of  the gender-based distinction in the VAP process, 
the government might claim that it has an interest 
in providing a child with a father rather than simply a 
second parent.68 Government and society’s preference 
for a two parent, opposite gender household is often 
premised on the notion that this is a healthier, more 
stable environment where children will grow up to 
understand and conform to their established gender 
roles.69 Such a justification, however, is not a valid 
reason to place an unconstitutional gender-based 
distinction on parentage determinations.70 Most 
distinctions between a father and a second parent 
would be based on stereotypes and are, therefore, not 
legitimate government interests that will satisfy equal 
protection.71
In the context of  the VAP process, if  a non-
biological male can consent to parentage through 
the VAP process, then in order to satisfy equal 
protection, a non-biological female should have the 
same access to the VAP procedure. While Congress 
and state legislatures may have intended states only 
to use VAPs in cases where an unwed mother can 
identify a potential biological father, in reality the 
statutes are often not used in that way and the finding 
of  parentage is still upheld. In In the Matter of  J.B. 
and J.G., J.B. was listed on the child’s birth certificate 
and signed an affidavit of  paternity.72 After a 
disagreement regarding the child’s schooling, J.B. filed 
in family court to establish his parental rights, and J.G. 
responded by alleging that J.B. was not the biological 
father and therefore did not have any parental rights.73 
The court determined that despite genetic testing 
that confirmed that J.B. was not biologically related 
to the child, overturning a previously established 
determination of  parentage would be inconsistent 
with the legislature’s intent.74 The court reasoned that 
because biology is not the sole avenue to establish 
parentage, the legislature intended for an expansive 
definition of  parent.75 Because J.B. correctly followed 
procedure to establish himself  as a parent under the 
law, his lack of  a biological relationship to the child 
did not bar him from enjoying the same parental 
rights to care and make decisions for the child as the 
mother.76 Accordingly, state VAP statutes should not 
differentiate based on the co-parent’s gender and lack 
of  biological ties to the child and should allow lesbian 
parents to access the VAP process.
C.  Use of  Voluntary Acknowledgements of  Paternity 
within lesbian parenting couples furthers Congress’ 
original policy considerations in enacting the federal 
VAP statute.
Allowing same-sex couples access to VAPs 
furthers Congress’ original policy considerations to 
create judicial and administrative ease in determining 
a child’s parentage and allow for efficient collection 
of  child support funds.77 In a child support system 
based on legal paternity rather than biology, allowing 
a co-parent to establish parentage early in the child’s 
life identifies another adult who is responsible for 
financially supporting the child. To further this goal, 
federal law states that after the 60-day rescission 
period, the parties may only challenge a VAP on the 
basis of  fraud, duress, or material mistake.78 Once 
the parties have identified a second legal, financially 
responsible parent, Congress does not allow the 
parties to rescind the finding arbitrarily. By making 
the process of  invalidating a VAP more difficult, 
the government can collect child support more 
efficiently because the parties have already consented 
to being financial responsible for the child. If  the 
couple separates before the child reaches the age of  
majority, or the couple chooses to never maintain a 
relationship, the parties will have already established 
paternity through the VAP process, and a judicial 
hearing to determine paternity will not be necessary 
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for the government to determine which individuals 
are responsible for paying child support.
In some jurisdictions, if  a custodial parent 
requires government assistance, the government 
will reimburse itself  by enforcing a child support 
order against the other biological parent (District 
of  Columbia operates this way). First, however, the 
government must find this individual, and spends 
public resources doing so. If  a second parent can 
establish paternity through the VAP process, the 
co-parent responsible for financially supporting the 
child has already been identified, and the government 
will not have to expend resources ascertaining the 
second responsible parent.79 Allowing all couples, 
regardless of  sexual orientation, to access the VAP 
process would relieve the government of  the burden 
of  soliciting personal information on a child’s other 
parent from a birth mother on public assistance.
Additionally, the court system would also 
be freed from the burden of  judicially establishing 
the paternity of  the other responsible parent. The 
VAP process, as it was intended, already allows 
heterosexual parents to consent to a judicial finding 
of  paternity. Allowing both heterosexual and lesbian 
couples access to this system permits the government 
to identify a co-parent in an additional situation 
where the parents are willing to consent to a judicial 
finding of  paternity, thereby furthering Congress’ 
goal of  creating administrative ease and efficient 
collection of  child support. 80 Parents and children 
would be best served and legally protected, and the 
government’s objectives of  administrative efficiency 
would be met, if  state legislatures allow same-sex 
parents to consent to parentage through a VAP just 
as heterosexual, unmarried parents are allowed.
IV.	Conclusion
Congress created the VAP system to allow 
unwed mothers the opportunity to establish the 
paternity of  a father at the child’s birth with relative 
simplicity. Such a system relieves both the judicial and 
administrative agencies of  the burden of  determining 
who are – or should be – a child’s parents. Although 
no states currently allow same-sex couples access to 
the VAP process, legislatures should open the VAP 
system to same-sex couples. In practice, biology is 
not the controlling factor for upholding paternity, and 
therefore, biology should not be the determinative 
criteria for allowing access to the VAP process. 
Additionally, allowing a similarly situated man access 
to the system but denying that same access to a woman 
violates equal protection; the government interests 
Congress identified are not substantially related to 
the gender discrimination in the VAP system. Finally, 
to satisfy Congress’ goals of  establishing parentage 
and allowing for ease in collecting child support, 
lesbian couples should have access to a system that 
easily creates a judicial determination of  parentage. 
If  two adults agree to co-parent and the mother is 
willing to consent to parentage, access to the VAP 
system creates ease for the government, the parents, 
and the child, and as a matter of  public policy, the 
system should be accessible to both heterosexual and 
lesbian couples.
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LEGAL	IMPEDIMENTS	FACING	NONIMMIGRANTS	
ENTERING	LICENSED	PROFESSIONS
By Justin Storch1
In 2005, Karen LeClerc, Guillame Jarry, 
Beatrice Boulord, Maureen Affl eck, Caroline Wallace, 
and Emily Maw sought admission to the Louisiana 
Bar.2 Emily Maw, a graduate of  Tulane University 
Law School, and the others, who were graduates 
of  law schools outside the United States, were all in 
the United States legally on J-1 or H-1B visas.3 J-1 
visas allow participants in exchange-visitor programs 
to travel to the United States, whereas H-1B visas 
provide opportunities for foreign workers in specialty 
occupations to work in the United States.
Despite their good academic standing, and 
the fact that Emily Maw possessed a U.S. law degree, 
the United States Court of  Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, in LeClerc v. Webb upheld a Louisiana Supreme 
Court rule prohibiting these foreign born individuals 
from taking the Louisiana Bar due to their lack of  
legal permanent resident (LPR) status.4 LPR status is 
given to immigrants with the right to reside in the U.S. 
permanently. In denying non-LPRs from taking the 
bar examination, the State of  Louisiana denied them 
an opportunity to practice law in the state, denied 
Louisiana employers an opportunity to hire them 
(as well as other U.S. employers who need attorneys 
barred in Louisiana), and denied U.S. citizens in need 
of  legal services from utilizing and benefi tting from 
their legal skills and knowledge.
Had any of  these individuals been LPRs, 
they would have been allowed to take the Louisiana 
bar exam. The rule regarding LPRs and licensure 
exams fi nds its origins in In Re Griffi ths, where in 
1973 the Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut 
law that prohibited non-U.S. citizens from taking 
the Connecticut bar exam.5 Since then, states have 
not been able to discriminate against LPRs seeking 
licensure in their respective professions.
If  states cannot deny LPRs an opportunity 
to take the tests required for licensure, why were the 
plaintiffs in LeClerc denied the same opportunity? 
Despite the ruling in Griffi ths, some states, such 
as Louisiana, have continued to limit licensing 
procedures and also deny licensure to certain classes 
of  immigrants. These states draw a distinction 
between LPRs and those foreign nationals “admitted 
temporarily and for a specifi c purpose,” referred to as 
nonimmigrants.6 But courts have differed on whether 
to permit such a distinction. While the LeClerc court 
upheld the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision, 
barring nonimmigrants from taking licensing exams, 
the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of  New York invalidated a similarly 
restrictive law in Adusumelli v. Steiner.7 In Adusumelli, 
a New York education law limited U.S. citizens and 
LPRs to be licensed as pharmacists, leading a group 
of  26 nonimmigrant plaintiffs to fi le suit.8 The court 
overturned the law and allowed the nonimmigrant 
plaintiffs to take the licensing exams.9
The Adusumellli court provides a model that 
other courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, should 
follow. Courts should not use the distinction between 
LPRs and nonimmigrants to deny foreign nationals 
the opportunity to enter licensed professions in the 
U.S. Nonimmigrants with the necessary skills and 
knowledge to successfully enter professions such as 
law, medicine, and engineering should be encouraged 
to enter the U.S. market without unnecessary and 
irrational barriers.
This article argues that federal immigration 
law preempts state laws that prohibit nonimmigrants 
from taking state licensing exams. These state 
laws occupy the fi eld of  immigrant employment 
authorization, which is the domain of  the federal 
government. In doing so, they stand as an obstacle to 
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the federal government’s decision regarding a foreign 
national’s admission into the U.S., placing conditions 
upon U.S. residency that are absent from federal law. 
Furthermore, under an equal protection analysis, 
there is no significant distinction between immigrants 
and nonimmigrants, and therefore, all classifications 
based on alienage should be subject to strict judicial 
scrutiny.
Part I of  this article describes the distinction 
between immigrants and nonimmigrants, explaining 
the reasoning and distinctions that states have used to 
justify the denial of  licensure to nonimmigrants. Parts 
II and III discuss the legal issues regarding professional 
licensing for immigrants and nonimmigrants, 
respectively. Parts II and II also include a discussion 
of  the Griffiths, LeClerc and Adusumelli decisions 
and their impact on federal immigration law. Part 
IV outlines the policy implications of  a distinction 
between immigrants and nonimmigrants in state 
licensing procedures. Specifically, Part IV discusses 
the harm done to nonimmigrants, U.S. employers, 
and the U.S. as a whole, when laws, regulations, and 
court decisions deny nonimmigrants the opportunity 
to enter licensed professions. Part V is a legal 
analysis of  the distinction between immigrants and 
nonimmigrants. This section applies legal tests to 
examine how federal law preempts restrictive state 
licensure laws, and argues for similar preemption 
during an equal protection analysis. Part VI concludes 
the article, and argues for the elimination of  state 
licensure laws that prohibit nonimmigrants from 
obtaining licensure.
I.		 DISTINCTION	BETWEEN	IMMIGRANTS	
AND	NONIMMIGRANTS
The Department of  Homeland Security 
(DHS) groups foreign nationals seeking to enter the 
U.S. into two broad categories: nonimmigrants and 
immigrants. Nonimmigrants are foreign nationals 
that are “admitted temporarily and for a specific 
purpose.”10 Several categories of  foreign nationals 
fall into the broader category of  nonimmigrants, 
including temporary workers, students, foreign 
diplomats, tourists, and business travelers.11 The 
complete list of  nonimmigrant visa classifications is 
set forth in the subsections of  Section 101(a)(15) of  
the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA).12
Nonimmigrants are restricted both on the 
amount of  time they can be present in the United 
States, and the activities in which they can participate.13 
For instance, a nonimmigrant admitted on a student 
visa does not have unfettered work authorization, as 
the individual is limited to the practical training that 
relates to the nonimmigrant’s student visa. Moreover, 
a nonimmigrant admitted as a temporary worker does 
not have authorization to attend a university.
Generally, nonimmigrants must express their 
intent to stay in the U.S. only for a short period of  
time. However, the U.S. Department of  State (State 
Department) has recognized a doctrine of  “dual 
intent” for certain classes of  nonimmigrants.14 After 
the Immigration Act of  1990, the State Department 
concluded that Congress should eliminate 
nonimmigrant intent as a factor in adjudicating 
applications for H-1 visas, which are used by 
temporary workers in specialty occupations, and L 
visas, which are used by intra-company transferees.15 
Thus, an applicant in either visa category can come to 
the U.S. in nonimmigrant status, while simultaneously 
pursuing permanent residence status.
The INA defines “immigrants” as “every alien 
except an alien who is within one of  the . . . classes 
of  nonimmigrant aliens” listed in Section 101(a)(15).16 
Under Section 214(b) of  the INA, immigration officials 
must presume that all foreign nationals entering the 
U.S. intend to immigrate to the U.S. permanently. But 
this intention is not presumed for those entering the 
U.S. in the L, V, and H-1 visa categories.17 Thus, all 
foreign nationals entering the U.S. as legal permanent 
residents (LPRs) are immigrants.
II.		LICENSING	AND	IMMIGRANTS	(LEGAL	
PERMANENT	RESIDENTS)
In the 1886 landmark case of  Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court allowed Chinese 
immigrants to bring an equal protection challenge 
against a San Francisco laundry ordinance, which was 
being discriminately enforced against them.18 The 
14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits 
states from denying equal protection under U.S. law 
to persons within the several states.19 In Yick Wo, the 
Court established that lawfully present resident aliens 
were considered “persons” within the meaning of  the 
equal protection clause of  the 14th Amendment.20
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In Graham v. Richardson, in determining 
whether the states of  Arizona and Pennsylvania could 
deny government assistance to resident aliens, the 
Court went a step further than the Yick Wo Court. It 
declared, “classifications based on alienage, like those 
based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect 
and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”21 In Graham, the 
states posited that they had a “special public interest” 
in distribution of  government resources toward its 
own citizens.22 The Court rejected this argument, 
noting that resident aliens also pay taxes, and that “[t]
here can be no ‘special public interest’ in tax revenues 
to which aliens have contributed on an equal basis 
with the residents of  the State.”23
In 1973, the Court in In re Griffiths 
specifically addressed the question of  state licensing 
laws for LPRs. In Griffiths, an LPR with citizenship 
in the Netherlands satisfied all the qualifications for 
admission to the Connecticut bar, except for the 
requirement that an applicant had to be a U.S. citizen 
to be admitted to the bar.24 The Court again applied 
strict judicial scrutiny, and emphasized that because 
resident aliens pay taxes, may serve in the Armed 
Forces, and contribute to society in a variety of  ways, 
they should not be denied the opportunity to become 
licensed professionals.25 Thus, the Court placed a 
heavy burden on states in justifying the denial of  
employment opportunities based on alienage.26
The Griffiths Court noted that states have a 
legitimate interest in ensuring that those admitted 
to the bar meet “the character and general fitness 
requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law.”27 
However, the Court found that the character and 
general fitness requirements were not used by the 
state of  Connecticut to exclude bar membership 
for foreign nationals.28 Instead, the state justified the 
exclusion by noting that foreign nationals may have a 
divided allegiance to the U.S. that would impede their 
ability to carry out certain duties, such as signing writs 
and subpoenas, and administering oaths.29
The Court found the state’s “divided 
allegiance” argument unconvincing. The decision 
noted that these duties “hardly involve matters of  
state policy or acts of  such unique responsibility as 
to entrust them only to citizens.”30 Furthermore, the 
Court opined that although some resident aliens may 
be unsuited for the bar, it does not justify a wholesale 
exclusion of  resident aliens.31 In the Court’s opinion, 
the continued scrutiny attorneys face once admitted 
to the bar, such as sanctions and disbarment, would 
reduce unethical behavior in resident alien attorneys.32
The Court has applied the same reasoning 
from Griffiths in other cases, prohibiting states from 
limiting access to professions based on alienage. In 
Sugarman v. Dougall, the Court struck down a New 
York state law that limited the appointment of  
competitive civil service jobs to U.S. citizens, and 
excluded aliens.33 Likewise, in Examining Board of  
Engineers v. Flores de Otero, the Court struck down a 
Puerto Rican law that limited the granting of  civil 
engineering private practice licenses to U.S. citizens.34
The Court has delineated two exceptions to 
the general rule that states cannot deny employment 
opportunities based on alienage. First, the Court has 
recognized that states can have a legitimate interest 
in limiting the access to employment that serves a 
political and governmental function to U.S. Citizens.35 
For instance, in Foley v. Connelie, the Court upheld a 
New York state law that permitted only U.S citizens 
to be employed by the state police force.36 Second, a 
state may deny employment opportunities to those 
who are not lawfully present in the U.S.37 For example, 
in DeCanas v. Bica, the Court upheld a California 
law imposing criminal sanctions on employers 
who knowingly employ immigrants without work 
authorization, which result in fewer employers willing 
to hire undocumented workers.38
III.	LICENSING	AND	NONIMMIGRANTS
While the Supreme Court has struck 
down laws that prohibit non-citizens from entering 
licensed professions, it has never directly addressed 
the issue of  whether states may distinguish between 
immigrants and nonimmigrants in their licensure 
procedures. However, lower courts have addressed 
the issue and have reached varied conclusions.
In LeClerc, the U.S. Court of  Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit considered a Louisiana Supreme Court 
rule that restricted the admission of  U.S. citizens and 
resident aliens to the Louisiana bar.39 The Louisiana 
Supreme Court in In Re Bourke, interpreted the phrase 
“resident alien” to include “only . . . those aliens who 
have attained permanent resident status in the United 
States.”40 Challenging this decision, the plaintiffs in 
LeClerc claimed that the Court in Griffiths, in applying 
strict judicial scrutiny to a law affecting LPRs, 
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supported the proposition that all immigrants were a 
suspect class (a class for which all laws discriminating 
against the class are inherently suspect) and, therefore, 
the Louisiana rule is subject to strict scrutiny.41 This 
line of  reason follows from the Graham court’s 
reasoning that it is inherently suspect for a law to uses 
classifications based on alienage and, therefore, such 
laws should be subject to strict scrutiny.42
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the plaintiffs, 
stating that nonimmigrants “are not a suspect class 
under Griffiths.”43 The court noted a “paramount” 
distinction between the plaintiffs in LeClerc and the 
plaintiffs in Griffiths, as the former was a group of  
nonimmigrants and the latter was a group of  LPRs.44 
The court noted that nonimmigrants “ordinarily 
stipulate before entry to this country that they have 
no intention of  abandoning their native citizenship.”45 
In the eyes of  the court, nonimmigrants are not 
“similarly situated” to U.S. citizens in the way that 
permanent residents are because of  their temporary 
connection to the U.S. Because of  this temporary 
and dissimilar connection, nonimmigrants are not 
entitled to strict judicial scrutiny.46 The court upheld 
the Louisiana rule applying rational basis review.47
The Adusumelli court reached a different 
conclusion.48 In Adusumelli v. Steiner, the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of  New York 
considered a New York education law that limited the 
ability of  U.S. citizens and permanent residents to be 
licensed as pharmacists.49 The twenty-six plaintiffs in 
Adusumelli were nonimmigrant pharmacists residing 
in the U.S., either with H-1B visas or “TN” temporary 
worker status (a status created by the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for citizens of  
Canada and Mexico).50
The Adusumelli court found that the state 
law interfered with federal immigration power 
reserved for Congress in the U.S. Constitution 
through the Naturalization Clause, which gives 
Congress the power to “establish a uniform Rule of  
Naturalization”, and the Supremacy Clause, which 
states that the Constitution and other federal laws 
will be the supreme law of  the land.51 The state 
argued that Congress explicitly gave states discretion 
in this field through  8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(v)(A), 
which states that “[i]f  an occupation requires a state 
or local license for an individual to fully perform 
the duties of  the occupation, an alien . . . seeking [a 
temporary work visa] in that occupation must have 
that license prior to approval of  the petition.”52 The 
court, however, concluded that this merely outlines a 
division of  labor, finding that the federal government 
determines admissibility, while the state determines 
professional competence.53
The State of  New York, referencing LeClerc, 
noted that legal permanent residents pay taxes, 
can serve in the military, and can work in the U.S. 
indefinitely, whereas other foreign nationals have 
less in common with U.S. citizens.54 The state argued 
that the plaintiffs, therefore, were not entitled to 
strict scrutiny in an equal protection analysis.55 The 
court noted, however, that nonimmigrants are largely 
subject to the same tax rules as U.S. citizens, at least 
in regards to their U.S. income.56
Additionally, the Adusumelli court referenced 
the doctrine of  dual intent.57 This doctrine allows 
holders of  certain classes of  visas to pursue 
permanent residence while residing in the U.S. as a 
nonimmigrant. Regarding this doctrine, the court 
noted that nonimmigrants are not as transient as 
other courts have characterized them to be, and that 
many nonimmigrants are in the process of  applying 
for green cards.58 The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Nyquist v. Mauclet, played a pivotal role in the 
Adusumelli court’s reasoning regarding the somewhat 
transient nature of  nonimmigrants.59 In Nyquist, the 
Supreme Court considered a New York law that 
denied financial assistance for higher education to 
those who had not applied for citizenship, or did not 
intend to do so once eligible.60 The Supreme Court 
applied strict scrutiny in invalidating the law, and 
rejected the practice of  discriminating against foreign 
nationals on the basis of  transience.61
Furthermore, the Adusumelli decision noted 
that nonimmigrants are no less likely to be the victim of  
irrational discrimination than their LPR counterparts; 
in fact, they are more likely to be discriminated 
against.62 The court noted that when a group is subject 
to such irrational discrimination, courts usually apply 
at least heightened, or intermediate, scrutiny.63 The 
court found that denial of  an opportunity to obtain 
a pharmacist’s license triggers at least intermediate 
scrutiny, and that is was unnecessary to determine 
whether to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny 
because the law would fail at either level.64 The court 
found that the state was unable to show that there 
were “important governmental objectives and that the 
discriminatory means employed [were] substantially 
THE MODERN AMERICAN16
related to the achievement of  those objectives,” as 
required in intermediate scrutiny cases.65
IV.		POLICY	IMPLICATIONS	OF	THE	
IMMIGRANT/NONIMMIGRANT	
LICENSING	DISTINCTION
Restrictive state licensure laws deny 
opportunities to highly educated and qualified foreign 
workers, who not only benefit the U.S. workforce, 
but also the nation as a whole. Congress did not 
create multiple categories of  nonimmigrant work 
visas haphazardly. For instance, with the H-1B visa, 
Congress intentionally promoted the inclusion of  
highly educated and qualified foreign nationals into 
the U.S. workforce. The H-1B classification is a visa 
category that allows foreign nationals who work in 
“specialty occupations” to seek employment in the 
U.S.66 The law defines a “specialty occupation” as one 
that requires a “theoretical and practical application 
of  a body of  highly specialized knowledge,” and a 
bachelor’s degree or its equivalent.67 While full-state 
licensure is required to practice in a specific state, 
the law does not permit states to create separate 
requirements or deny licenses based on alienage.68
In determining whether foreign nationals 
should be able to work in the U.S., either on a 
temporary or permanent basis, Congress evaluated 
the costs and benefits of  immigration. Regarding 
licensed professions, foreign nationals must meet the 
same requirements of  licensure as other U.S. citizens; 
however, there is no indication that Congress intended 
for foreign nationals to meet additional requirements.
Furthermore, when state licensing 
requirements for foreign nationals are not uniform, 
the inconsistency creates uncertainty for foreign 
nationals who wish to enter a licensed profession. 
Numerous professions require licensure to practice 
in multiple states, but because of  the varied nature 
of  state licensure recruitments, a foreign national 
admitted to practice in one state may be ineligible 
in another. Likewise, a foreign national who wishes 
to transfer jobs once in the U.S., could face barriers 
that U.S. citizens and permanent residents do not 
encounter. For instance, an attorney with an H-1B 
visa practicing law in New York would not be able to 
transfer to a job in Louisiana, regardless if  the attorney 
had the knowledge and skill necessary to pass the 
Louisiana bar. Essentially, these requirements reduce 
the freedom of  nonimmigrants, and discourage 
foreign nationals from accepting new employment or 
changing jobs.
Proponents of  restrictive licensure laws 
contend that licensed professionals who are non-U.S. 
citizens, or are LPRs, are more likely to be transient, 
and are likely to leave their job after a relatively short 
period of  time and return to their native country. 
To mitigate these concerns regarding transience, 
U.S. immigration policy should encourage licensed 
professionals to remain in the U.S. With dual intent 
visas, such as H-1B and L-1 visas, even nonimmigrants 
have a way to become citizens, which reduces the risk 
of  transience. While some professionals may come 
to the U.S. without the intent to remain permanently, 
immigration policy should balance the risk of  
transience against the benefits these foreign nationals 
could provide during their temporary employment. 
These benefits, although temporary, greatly outweigh 
the negative effects of  transience.
Domestic employers benefit tremendously 
from their ability to hire the best professionals from 
around the world. Likewise, the nation as a whole 
benefits from being able to obtain high quality 
professional services, and arbitrary obstacles based 
on the nationality and immigration status only 
hinders this ability. Thus, states should not only 
permit foreign nationals to apply for such licensure, 
they should encourage it.
V.		 LEGAL	ANALYSIS	OF	THE	IMMIGRANT/
NONIMMIGRANT	DISTINCTION
A.  Federal immigration law supersedes state laws 
that prohibit nonimmigrants from entering licensed 
professions
As the Adusumelli court noted, the federal 
government has sole power to implement U.S. 
immigration policy. As previously stated, this power 
comes from the U.S. Constitution through the 
Naturalization Clause, and the Supremacy Clause.69 
Various courts have used the DeCanas tests, which 
is described below, to determine whether federal 
law preempts a state law that affects immigration. 
Although the Adusumelli court referred to the DeCanas 
case and tests, and reached a conclusion in harmony 
with the tests, it did so without explicitly applying 
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them. This section will analyze and apply the DeCanas 
tests to the immigrant/nonimmigrant distinction.
DeCanas	Tests
In League of  United Latin American Citizens 
v. Wilson (LULAC), the U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of  California reviewed a voter-
approved initiative. The initiative gave state officials 
the authority to verify the immigration status of  
people with whom they come in contact, and deny 
health care, education, and other benefits based 
on their determination.70 In determining whether 
the initiative at issue in LULAC was preempted by 
federal law, the District Court looked to the Supreme 
Court case of  DeCanas v. Bica.71 In DeCanas, migrant 
farm workers in California challenged a state law 
that placed criminal sanctions upon employers who 
knowingly employed undocumented immigrants, if  
such employment adversely affected lawful resident 
workers.72
The Court in DeCanas proffered three tests 
to assist in their analysis of  the state law. The first 
DeCanas test requires a court to determine whether 
the state action is a “regulation of  immigration.”73 The 
DeCanas Court defines “regulation of  immigration” 
as “essentially a determination of  who should or 
should not be admitted into the country, and the 
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”74 
However, not all state regulations that affect 
immigrants are “regulations of  immigration.”75 For 
example, in DeCanas, the Court dealt with a California 
law that imposed criminal sanctions on employers 
who knowingly hired immigrants without legal work 
authorization. This was found to be a regulation 
of  employment, not a pre-empted “regulation of  
immigration.”76
The second DeCanas test, requires a court to 
determine whether “Congress intended to ‘occupy the 
field’ which the statute attempts to regulate.”77 Even 
if  the state law is not a “regulation of  immigration,” 
it may nevertheless be preempted if  it occupies a field 
Congress has claimed for itself.78 The DeCanas Court 
concluded that, for a state law to be preempted, the 
“clear and manifest purpose” of  Congress must 
be “complete ouster of  state power including state 
power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal 
laws.”79
The third DeCanas test requires the court to 
determine if  a state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of  the full purposes 
and objectives of  Congress.”80 This test was fashioned 
by the Supreme Court in Hines v. Davidowitz.81 In Hines, 
the Court examined a Pennsylvania law that set up a 
state level immigrant registration scheme, which had 
registration, information disclosure, and identification 
requirements for aliens beyond what was required 
by federal law.82 The Court decided that federal law 
preempted the Pennsylvania law because the federal 
government had exercised its constitutional authority 
to implement the standards for alien registration and 
states could not add to these requirements.83
1.  State licensure laws survive the first 
DeCanas test, because they are not 
regulations of  immigration.
As noted above, a “regulation of  
immigration” is “essentially a determination of  who 
should or should not be admitted into the country, 
and the conditions under which a legal entrant 
may remain.”84 However, if  the state law primarily 
affects another field other than immigration, it is 
not considered a regulation of  immigration.85 This 
was the case in DeCanas, where the state sanctioned 
employers rather than determining the admission 
status of  the immigrant, or altering the conditions 
under which an immigrant may remain in the 
U.S.86 The Court described the California law as 
having a “purely speculative and indirect impact on 
immigration.”87 In contrast, the LULAC court stated 
that to require a state official to question arrestees, 
applicants for state welfare benefits, students, and 
parents of  students regarding their immigration 
status, was a regulation of  immigration.88 The court 
found that the primary purpose of  the initiative was 
to place limitations on foreign nationals, and that 
federal law explicitly allows these individuals to enter 
and remain in the U.S. Accordingly, the court held 
that federal law preempted the state initiative.
State licensure laws that limit licensure to U.S. 
citizens and LPRs more closely resemble the state law 
at issue in DeCanas, rather than the initiative at issue 
in LULAC. Like DeCanas, state licensure laws do not 
specifically place conditions on who may remain in 
the U.S., rather these laws place regulations only on 
employment. The aim of  state licensing bodies is to 
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ensure that those who receive professional licenses 
meet the profession’s minimum qualifications and 
standards. Because this is a permissible state function, 
the fact that immigration status is a factor that a 
licensing body may find relevant, nevertheless does 
not make it a regulation of  immigration.
One might argue that like the initiative 
in LULAC, prohibitive state licensing laws place 
conditions on those who may remain in the U.S. and, 
thus, fail the first DeCanas test. However, the aim of  
the state licensing bodies is not to determine who 
may or may not enter or remain in the country. The 
licensing bodies’ only concern is with the standards 
for admission into the various professions. Thus, 
while an argument comparing state licensing laws 
to LULAC is interesting, it is likely not compelling 
enough to invalidate these state licensure laws.
2.  Prohibitive state licensure laws fail 
the second DeCanas test, as Congress 
intended to occupy the field of  
immigrant admissions.
The second DeCanas test notes that federal 
law preempts state or local law, regardless of  whether 
it is a “regulation of  immigration,” if  Congress 
intended to “occupy the field” that the state law seeks 
to regulate.89 Under this test, federal law preempts 
state law only if  Congress’s clear and manifest 
purpose is a complete ouster of  state regulatory 
power within the field.90
In DeCanas, the Court noted that states have 
“broad authority under their police powers to regulate 
the employment relationship to protect workers 
within the State.”91 Therefore, the state in DeCanas had 
the power to ensure that California employers would 
not employ those individuals not lawfully authorized 
to work in the U.S.92 The Court found no compelling 
evidence that Congress, through the INA, intended 
to oust state powers to regulate employment to 
ensure a lawful workforce.93 Therefore, the California 
law survived the second DeCanas test.94
State licensure laws are distinguishable from 
DeCanas in this regard. State licensing bodies have the 
authority to determine the standards for admission 
to a profession. This is a different type of  authority 
than the police power at issue in DeCanas. The state in 
DeCanas merely determined whether employees met 
federal standards for lawful employment, whereas 
state licensure boards create standards for admission 
at the state level to various professions.
It is evident that the federal government 
sought to occupy the field of  immigrant admissions. 
The federal government determines what the 
standards and requirements are for admission to the 
U.S. through a nonimmigrant visa, and adjudicates 
individuals on a case-by-case basis. For instance, 
with H-1B visas, Congress has determined the 
qualifications necessary to work in the U.S. in a 
specialty occupation.95 While state licensure is 
required prior to issuance of  a visa, the Adusumelli 
court correctly noted a division of  labor.96 The federal 
government retains its domain over determinations 
of  admissibility, and the state government determines 
professional competence.97
3.  Prohibitive state licensure rules violate 
the third DeCanas test as they stand 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of  the full purposes and 
objectives of  Congress.
Under the third DeCanas test, federal 
immigration law preempts state and local regulations 
when they are found to be obstacles to “the 
accomplishment and execution of  the full purposes 
and objectives of  Congress.”98 The LULAC court 
stated this test somewhat differently, noting there is 
preemption if  state laws conflict with federal law, and 
compliance with both is impossible.99 The Court in 
Hines v. Davidowitz utilized this compliance test.
In Hines, the Court struck down annual 
registration and state identification requirements, 
because the federal government has its own uniform 
registration and identification requirements.100 
Similarly, the classification, notification, and 
cooperation/reporting provisions of  the initiative 
at issue in LULAC, violated the third DeCanas test, 
because they conflicted with federal deportation 
laws.101 Furthermore, federal law preempted 
provisions of  the LULAC initiative that denied state 
benefits to immigrants when state officials reasonably 
suspected that an immigrant was not lawfully present. 
The Court held that the initiative was preempted 
because a state official’s “reasonable suspicion” is not 
the same as verification under federal law.102
Similarly, prohibitive state licensure laws 
directly conflict with federal immigration policy, 
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and are in violation of  the third DeCanas test. The 
federal government determines whether foreign 
nationals meet the requirements to work in the U.S. 
through nonimmigrant work visas. This includes 
a determination of  whether these individuals 
are qualified to practice in the specific specialty 
occupation. And generally, one of  the requirements 
for foreign nationals to obtain employment is to 
first become licensed by the state in their particular 
field. Thus, a foreign national must be able to 
take bar exams, medical licensing exams, etc. to 
determine admissibility. When a state determines 
that nonimmigrants are ineligible to take such an 
exam, the state stands as an obstacle to the federal 
government’s determination of  admissibility.
B.  There is no significant distinction between 
immigrants and nonimmigrants for purposes of  
equal protection analysis and strict scrutiny should 
also apply to laws affecting nonimmigrants.
As noted above, the Supreme Court in Yick 
Wo determined that legally present resident aliens are 
“persons” for the purpose of  an equal protection 
analysis.103 Furthermore, classifications based on 
alienage are subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and the 
Court will apply this strict scrutiny to laws affecting 
LPRs.104
Despite the Supreme Court’s application of  
strict scrutiny to alienage classifications, during an 
equal protection analysis the LeClerc court drew a 
distinction between immigrants and nonimmigrants.105 
The Adusumelli court disagreed with the LeClerc court, 
noting that nonimmigrants are generally subject to the 
same federal income tax rules as their LPR and U.S. 
citizen counterparts.106 Furthermore, the doctrine 
of  dual intent allows certain nonimmigrants to seek 
permanent residence in the U.S., while residing in the 
U.S. on temporary visas.107
The Adusumelli court’s analysis is correct 
and the most viable. However, the court did not 
reach a holding as to whether strict scrutiny or 
intermediate scrutiny should apply to laws affecting 
nonimmigrants. The court found the determination 
of  the level of  judicial scrutiny pointless, because 
the licensing law under either standard would fail.108 
Despite the Court’s decision to forgo such a holding, 
its analysis strongly suggests that laws affecting 
nonimmigrants should be subject to strict scrutiny.
The Adusumelli court noted that the Supreme 
Court in Nyquist applied strict scrutiny to a law affecting 
foreign nationals who had not, and did not intend to 
apply for permanent residency.109 Therefore, it logically 
follows from Nyquist that strict scrutiny should apply 
to licensing laws preventing nonimmigrants from 
entering licensed professions. Furthermore, the Graham 
Court’s reason for determining that classifications 
based on alienage are subject to strict scrutiny was that 
such a classification was inherently suspect, and that 
immigrants are a “discrete and insular minority.”110 
Classifications that affect nonimmigrants are no less 
inherently suspect than classifications that affect LPRs, 
and nonimmigrants are certainly a discrete and insular 
minority.
Should the Supreme Court consider a case 
regarding licensing of  nonimmigrants, the Court 
should clarify that its application of  strict scrutiny 
to classifications based on alienage covers all foreign 
nationals, regardless of  whether they are immigrants 
or nonimmigrants.
VI.		CONCLUSION
The state licensing process for professionals 
should be open to U.S. citizens, immigrants, and 
nonimmigrants alike. Federal immigration power 
preempts states laws that prohibit nonimmigrants 
from entering professions such as law, medicine 
and engineering. Moreover, Congress has occupied 
the field of  immigrant admissions, and, thus, these 
state licensing laws stand as an obstacle to federal 
determination of  admissibility. Furthermore, such 
laws should be subject to strict scrutiny because there 
is no significant distinction between immigrants and 
nonimmigrants in an equal protection analysis.
Nonimmigrants who face the barriers such as 
ones faced by the plaintiffs in LeClerc, who are merely 
coming to the U.S. to better their lives by entering 
licensed professions, have a tough and precarious 
predicament, and deserve relief. The denial of  an 
opportunity to enter their professions not only hurts 
the individuals, but U.S. employers, and citizens 
who would benefit from their work. Congress and 
state legislatures should eliminate prohibitive state 
licensure laws and regulations, such as the Louisiana 
bar rule. And if  necessary, the courts should act and 
strike them down. If  nonimmigrants can take the 
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licensing exams required for their field in all states, an 
impediment will disappear, uncertainty will dissipate, 
and highly educated and qualified workers will be 
encouraged to bring their skills to the U.S.
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THE	EMERGING	TREND	OF	EXTENDING	ADA	
REASONABLE	ACCOMMODATION	BEYOND	THE	
WORKPLACE	TO	INCLUDE	COMMUTING	ISSUES:	
A	COMMENT	ON	COLWELL V. RITE AID
By Frederick J. Melkey1
I.	 Introduction
A. Colwell v. Rite Aid Breaks New Ground
The Americans with Disability Act2
(“ADA”) requires an employer to provide reasonable 
accommodation to an employee or job applicant with 
a disability, unless doing so would cause signifi cant 
diffi culty or expense for the employer.3 The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 
describes a reasonable accommodation as “any 
change in the work environment (or in the way things are 
usually done) to help a person with a disability apply 
for a job, perform the duties of  a job, or enjoy the 
benefi ts and privileges of  employment.”4 Historically, 
employers have understood that the scope of  a 
“reasonable accommodation” is limited to the 
workplace.5 As one court stated, “[w]hile an employer 
is required to provide reasonable accommodations 
that eliminate barriers in the work environment, an 
employer is not required to eliminate those barriers 
which exist outside the work environment.”6
Last year, the Third Circuit broke with 
historical precedent in the case of  Colwell v. Rite 
Aid Corp.7 It stated that the ADA “does not strictly 
limit the breadth of  reasonable accommodations to 
address only those problems that an employee has 
in performing her work that arise once she arrives 
at the workplace.”8 Colwell was in direct confl ict with 
a Third Circuit unpublished decision by a different 
three judge panel.9 This result led to concern within 
the employer community about judicial expansion of  
the reasonable accommodation requirement under 
the ADA.10 Fueling employer concerns is a new 
unpublished decision in the Ninth Circuit, Livingston 
v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc.11 which favorably cites Colwell, 
and also fi nds that the employer needs to consider 
a reasonable accommodation for the non-workplace 
commute.
Colwell has drawn limited commentary 
from the academic community. Professor Sullivan 
mentions in a blog posting that Colwell may implicate 
the existing EEOC guidance that the ADA does 
not require an employer to make accommodations 
primarily for the employee’s personal benefi t.12 As 
he points out, “getting to work is not exactly for 
personal benefi t, but both cases [Colwell and a 1995 
case which it cites] illustrate the occasional diffi culty 
of  drawing the work/personal line. Certainly, many 
employers view their workers’ commutation as their 
own responsibility.”13
This paper recommends that although much 
of  the case law14 has not interpreted the reasonable 
accommodation provision of  the ADA as broadly as 
Colwell, the holding and reasoning should be adopted 
by other circuits. Both legislative history and public 
policy reasons militate in favor of  this approach. Much 
like the courts chipped away at the ADA’s defi nition 
of  a “person with a disability,” narrowing it to the 
point it required Congress to enact amendments in 
2008 to overturn Supreme Court precedent,15 the 
courts have been similarly limiting the interpretation 
of  “reasonable accommodation.” I promote a return 
to requiring employers and employees to engage in 
the interactive process envisioned by the ADA in 
circumstances similar to those in Colwell. A broader 
reading of  the ADA’s reasonable accommodation 
requirements would not be judicial expansion, but a 
return to both the original meaning of  the Act and the 
intent of  Congress when it enacted the ADA twenty 
years ago. To that end, Colwell is not really breaking 
new ground; it is replacing the divot16 made by courts as 
they have taken repeated swings at the statute.
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B.  A Summary of  the Original and Continuing need 
for the ADA
People with disabilities have endured an 
inferior economic position in American society.17 
Before passage of  the ADA in 1990
[T]wo out of  every three disabled 
Americans of  working-age were not 
employed, and two of  three who 
were not working wanted to be, the 
income of  disabled workers was 
about thirty six percent less than 
that of  their nondisabled counter-
parts, and in 1984 fifty percent of  
adults with disabilities had house-
hold incomes of  $15,000 or less, 
compared to only twenty-five per-
cent of  non-disabled adults.18
Many of  these trends continue to this day. 
In November of  2010, more than two out of  three 
working-age people with disabilities were still not 
employed; those without disabilities were employed at 
roughly twice that rate.19 As the Department of  Labor 
recently articulated in a news release seeking public 
input on ways to strengthen disability regulations
…the rate of  disabled people who 
are unemployed or not in the labor 
force remain[s] significantly higher 
than those without disabilities. 
According to recent data from the 
U.S. Department of  Labor’s Bureau 
of  Labor Statistics, 21.7 percent of  
people with disabilities were in the 
labor force in June 2010, compared 
with 70.5 percent of  people with 
no disability. In addition, the unem-
ployment rate for those with dis-
abilities was 14.4 percent, compared 
with 9.4 percent unemployment for 
those without a disability.
“Work is central to every person’s 
financial independence, sense of  
self  and integrity,” said OFCCP 
Director Patricia A. Shiu.20
This poor experience of  the disabled in the 
workplace can not be explained solely by the types of  
prejudice encountered by racial and ethnic minorities, 
women, and the elderly.21 Many disabilities prevent 
effective performance in a broad variety of  jobs.22 
Moreover, employers may find it efficient to refuse 
to hire anyone with particular disabilities regardless 
of  their ability to do the job because employers have 
structured their work processes and physical facilities 
for the average non-disabled worker.23 “The lowering 
of  this type of  barrier to the equal participation 
of  individuals in the workforce requires regulation 
beyond the mere condemnation of  unequal treatment 
on the basis of  disability as a suspect, protected 
class.”24 Instead, it requires the employers make 
accommodations for the disabled in the workplace. 
How far the employer must go to make reasonable 
accommodations is a policy choice with many facets.25
II.		The	History	of	Workplace	Disability	
Legislation
A.  The Precursor to the ADA: The Rehabilitation 
Act of  1973
In its first significant treatment of  how far 
employers must go to provide accommodation for 
disabled employees, Congress stopped short of  
imposing obligations on private employers that could 
not pass the costs along to the federal government.26 
The Rehabilitation Act of  197327 made the policy 
choice that those accommodation costs be assessed 
upon federal sector employers, federal contractors, 
and other employers receiving federal financial 
assistance.28
“The 1973 Act, in addition to increasing 
funding for vocational rehabilitation, sought to 
eradicate discriminatory and other barriers to the hiring 
of  disabled workers.”29 Part of  the purpose stated in 
the statute is “to ensure that the Federal Government 
plays a leadership role in promoting the employment 
of  individuals with disabilities, especially individuals 
with significant disabilities, and in assisting States and 
providers of  services in fulfilling the aspirations of  
such individuals with disabilities for meaningful and 
gainful employment and independent living.”30
“Section 501 imposes affirmative action 
obligations on federal agencies. Section 502 seeks to 
remove physical barriers in federal buildings. Section 
503 levies affirmative action duties on all federal 
contractors with contracts in excess of  $10,000. These 
duties extend to all of  the contractors’ operations.”31 
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Section 504 prohibits federal programs and any 
program or activity receiving federal funding assistance 
from discriminating against “otherwise qualified 
individual[s] with a disability . . . solely by reason of  
her or his disability.”32 Thus, the Rehabilitation Act 
of  1973 goes beyond the neutral treatment of  people 
with disabilities to require something more to ensure 
opportunities in employment.
B.  ADA: The American’s with Disabilities Act of  1990
“Congress rarely writes on a clean slate, 
and the ADA is no exception to this rule. Congress 
drew heavily on section 504 and its regulations when 
enacting the ADA.”33	Seventeen years after enacting 
the Rehabilitation Act, Congress took the next step 
of  imposing similar obligations on all but the smallest 
private employers by enacting the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.34 Supreme Court Justice Stevens 
noted
The ADA was passed by large 
majorities in both Houses of  Con-
gress after decades of  deliberation 
and investigation into the need 
for comprehensive legislation to 
address discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities. In the years 
immediately preceding the ADA’s 
enactment, Congress held 13 hear-
ings and created a special task force 
that gathered evidence from every 
State in the Union. The conclusions 
Congress drew from this evidence 
are set forth in the task force and 
Committee Reports, described in 
lengthy legislative hearings, and 
summarized in the preamble to 
the statute. Central among these 
conclusions was Congress’ finding 
that “individuals with disabilities 
are a discrete and insular minority 
who have been faced with restric-
tions and limitations, subjected to 
a history of  purposeful unequal 
treatment, and relegated to a posi-
tion of  political powerlessness in 
our society, based on characteris-
tics that are beyond the control of  
such individuals and resulting from 
stereotypic assumptions not truly 
indicative of  the individual ability 
of  such individuals to participate in, 
and contribute to, society.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(a)(7).
Invoking “the sweep of  congressio-
nal authority, including the power to 
enforce the fourteenth amendment 
and to regulate commerce,” the 
ADA is designed “to provide a clear 
and comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of  discrimi-
nation against individuals with dis-
abilities.” §§ 12101(b)(1), (b)(4). It 
forbids discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities in three major 
areas of  public life: employment, 
which is covered by Title I of  the 
statute; public services, programs, 
and activities, which are the subject 
of  Title II; and public accommo-
dations, which are covered by Title 
III.35
Also key within the employment context is 
that the ADA defines a “qualified individual with a 
disability” to mean “an individual with a disability 
who, with or without a reasonable accommodation can 
perform the essential functions of  the employment 
position that such individual holds or desires.”36 It 
also expressly includes as a category of  discrimination 
“not making reasonable accommodations to the known 
physical or mental limitations of  an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability who is an 
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose 
an undue hardship on the operation of  the business 
of  such covered entity.”37 As such, the ADA “clearly 
seems to require employers something more than 
formally neutral treatment.”38
C.  ADAAA: The ADA Amendments Act of  2008
The ADA Amendments Act of  200839 
(ADAAA) is the most recent legislative response to 
the issues people with disabilities face. The ADAAA 
“represents a fairly dramatic change in disability 
law.”40 As Professor Long observes, many of  the 
objectives of  the ADA were never realized
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When the first President Bush signed 
the original Americans with Disabil-
ities Act (ADA) into law in 1990, he 
said it was time “to rejoice in and 
celebrate another ‘Independence 
Day,’ one that is long overdue.” For 
the 43 million Americans with dis-
abilities, the ADA was supposed to 
represent the opening of  doors that 
had long been closed. Employers, 
state and local governments, and 
private businesses—from bowling 
alleys to restaurants—would now be 
required to make reasonable modi-
fications to their facilities, policies, 
and procedures in order to allow full 
participation by individuals with dis-
abilities. In short, expectations for 
the ADA were high.
This probably explains why the 
ADA is viewed so widely by disabil-
ity rights advocates and its original 
authors as such a huge disappoint-
ment, especially in the employment 
context. Studies consistently reveal 
that, despite the ADA, employees 
who claim to be the victims of  dis-
ability discrimination in the work-
place face long odds. . . .
The ADA Amendments Act of  2008 sets 
out to address some of  the more controversial and 
problematic aspects of  the definition of  disability 41
The ADAAA is a legislative response to 
years of  judicial narrowing of  that definition as it 
specifically abrogates several Supreme Court rulings.42 
The statute indicates that the purpose is to “carry 
out the ADA’s objectives of  providing ‘a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination 
of  discrimination’ and ‘clear, strong, consistent, 
enforceable standards addressing discrimination’ 
by reinstating a broad scope of  protection to be 
available under the ADA”43 This expanded definition 
of  disability means that more people will be able to 
pass the initial coverage threshold, and be able to 
enter the interactive process in which an employer 
must consider reasonable accommodations.44
One issue that has recently divided the 
circuit courts is whether an employer must provide 
a reasonable accommodation to an individual that it 
merely “regards as” having a disability.45 “The Act 
provides that employers and other covered entities 
‘need not provide a reasonable accommodation or 
a reasonable modification to policies, practices, or 
procedures to an individual who meets’ the ‘regarded 
as’ definition. Thus, the new amendments effectively 
end the ongoing dispute among the courts on this 
issue.” 46 Congress did not address other aspects of  
reasonable accommodations.
III.	Defining	a	“Reasonable”	Accommodation
A.  Statutory Overview
Since Colwell is in the employment context, 
this paper focuses on the meaning of  a Reasonable 
Accommodation within Title I of  the ADA.47 
“One of  the most elusive concepts in the ADA is 
that of  ‘reasonable accommodation’ in the context 
of  employment.”48 There are several sections and 
definitions of  terms that must be read together to 
establish the standard for providing a reasonable 
accommodation.
To avoid discriminating against a qualified 
person with a disability, the text of  the statute requires 
that the employer “mak[e] reasonable accommodations 
to the known physical or mental limitations of  an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is 
an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity 
can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of  the 
business of  such covered entity.”49 The definitions 
section provides some clues to the meaning of  this 
passage. First, it defines a “qualified individual” 
as “an individual who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of  
the employment position that such individual holds 
or desires.”50 However, the very next sentence of  
the statute provides a surprise. “The ADA does not 
define ‘reasonable accommodation.’ Instead, it lists 
examples of  what the term may include.”51
The term “reasonable accommoda-
tion” may include—
(A) making existing facilities used by 
employees readily accessible to and 
usable by individuals with disabili-
ties; and
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(B) job restructuring, part-time 
or modified work schedules, reassign-
ment to a vacant position, acquisi-
tion or modification of  equipment 
or devices, appropriate adjustment 
or modifications of  examina-
tions, training materials or policies, 
the provision of  qualified readers 
or interpreters, and other similar 
accommodations for individuals 
with disabilities.52
While the accommodations in sub-paragraph 
A require physical changes to the workplace, those 
in sub-paragraph B are mandatory departures from 
neutral employer practices.53 As Professor Weber 
observes
In the text of  the ADA, Con-
gress buttressed its requirement 
that employers depart from oth-
erwise neutral rules by prohibiting 
standards, criteria, or methods of  
administration that have the effect 
of  discriminating on the basis of  
disability, as well as by outlawing 
qualification standards, employment 
tests, or other selection criteria that 
tend to screen out persons with dis-
abilities unless the standard, test, or 
other criterion is shown to be job-
related and consistent with business 
necessity. So not only may a variance 
or departure from an otherwise neu-
tral rule or practice be required as a 
matter of  reasonable accommoda-
tion, but also the neutral rule itself  
may be illegal when applied to an 
applicant or employee with a disabil-
ity if  it has a discriminatory effect or 
unjustified negative impact.54
Another key part of  understanding the duty to 
provide a reasonable accommodation is the limitation 
is that it must fall below the threshold of  an undue 
hardship. “Unlike reasonable accommodation, ‘undue 
hardship’ receives a statutory definition.”55 It includes 
not only a definition, but also a detailed list of  factors 
to consider when making the determination.
The term “undue hardship” means 
an action requiring significant dif-
ficulty or expense, when considered 
in light of  the factors set forth in 
subparagraph (B).
(B) Factors to be considered
In determining whether an accom-
modation would impose an undue 
hardship on a covered entity, factors 
to be considered include—
(i) the nature and cost of  the accom-
modation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources 
of  the facility or facilities involved 
in the provision of  the reason-
able accommodation; the num-
ber of  persons employed at such 
facility; the effect on expenses and 
resources, or the impact otherwise 
of  such accommodation upon the 
operation of  the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources 
of  the covered entity; the overall 
size of  the business of  a covered 
entity with respect to the number of  
its employees; the number, type, and 
location of  its facilities; and
(iv) the type of  operation or opera-
tions of  the covered entity, includ-
ing the composition, structure, and 
functions of  the workforce of  such 
entity; the geographic separateness, 
administrative, or fiscal relationship 
of  the facility or facilities in ques-
tion to the covered entity.56
Reading these portions of  the statute together, 
“[t]he text and structure of  the statute suggest a 
substantial obligation to provide accommodation 
up to the limit of  hardship demonstrated by the 
employer.”57
B.  EEOC Interpretation
Under the familiar Chevron doctrine, courts 
must grant deference to the EEOC’s interpretation 
of  the ADA where it is reasonable.58 “With regard to 
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reasonable accommodation and undue hardship, the 
EEOC regulations for Title I of  the ADA repeat the 
prohibition in the statute, stating that it is unlawful 
for covered entities to fail to make reasonable 
accommodations unless they can demonstrate that 
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship 
on the business operations of  the employer.”59 
Without providing a more detailed definition or 
factors to consider, “[l]ike the statute, the regulations 
rely more on example or typology than definition 
when discussing reasonable accommodation.”60 The 
EEOC regulations state that
[t]he term reasonable accommoda-
tions means: (i) [m]odifications or 
adjustments to a job application 
process that enable a qualified appli-
cant with a disability to be consid-
ered for the position such qualified 
applicant desires; or (ii) [m]odifica-
tions or adjustments to the work 
environment, or the manner or cir-
cumstances under which the posi-
tion held or desired is customarily 
performed, that enable a qualified 
individual with a disability to per-
form the essential functions of  that 
position; or (iii) [m]odifications or 
adjustments that enable a covered 
entity’s employee with a disability to 
enjoy equal benefits and privileges 
of  employment as are enjoyed by its 
other similarly situated employees 
without disabilities.
The regulations save their defini-
tional language for undue hardship, 
and essentially track the statute 
when they provide the definition. 
The regulations specifically list dif-
ficulties imposed on co-workers, 
not as part of  what may make an 
accommodation unreasonable, but 
as part of  what may make hardship 
undue for the employer.61
The EEOC Interpretative Guidance does 
go a bit deeper and provides additional examples and 
categories of  possible accommodations.
There are a number of  possible 
reasonable accommodations that 
an employer may have to provide 
in connection with modifications 
to the work environment or adjust-
ments in how and when a job is per-
formed. These include:
• making existing facilities accessible;
• job restructuring;
• part-time or modified work schedules;
•  acquiring or modifying equip-
ment;
•  changing tests, training materials, 
or policies;
• providing qualified readers or 
interpreters; and
•  reassignment to a vacant position.62
The Interpretive Guidance goes further in 
describing the requirements related to modifying 
work schedules as a reasonable accommodation in 
question and answer format with three examples of  
how it applies.
Must an employer allow an employee 
with a disability to work a modified 
or part-time schedule as a reason-
able accommodation, absent undue 
hardship?
Yes. A modified schedule may 
involve adjusting arrival or departure 
times, providing periodic breaks, 
altering when certain functions are 
performed, allowing an employee 
to use accrued paid leave, or pro-
viding additional unpaid leave. An 
employer must provide a modified 
or part-time schedule when required 
as a reasonable accommodation, 
absent undue hardship, even if  it 
does not provide such schedules for 
other employees.
Example A: An employee with HIV 
infection must take medication 
on a strict schedule. The medica-
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tion causes extreme nausea about 
one hour after ingestion, and gen-
erally lasts about 45 minutes. The 
employee asks that he be allowed to 
take a daily 45-minute break when 
the nausea occurs. The employer 
must grant this request absent 
undue hardship.
For certain positions, the time dur-
ing which an essential function is 
performed may be critical. This 
could affect whether an employer 
can grant a request to modify an 
employee’s schedule. Employers 
should carefully assess whether 
modifying the hours could signifi-
cantly disrupt their operations — 
that is, cause undue hardship — or 
whether the essential functions may 
be performed at different times with 
little or no impact on the operations 
or the ability of  other employees to 
perform their jobs.
If  modifying an employee’s sched-
ule poses an undue hardship, an 
employer must consider reassign-
ment to a vacant position that would 
enable the employee to work during 
the hours requested.
Example B: A day care worker 
requests that she be allowed to 
change her hours from 7:00 a.m.–
3:00 p.m. to 10:00 a.m.–6:00 p.m. 
because of  her disability. The day 
care center is open from 7:00 a.m.–
7:00 p.m. and it will still have suf-
ficient coverage at the beginning of  
the morning if  it grants the change 
in hours. In this situation, the 
employer must provide the reason-
able accommodation.
Example C: An employee works 
for a morning newspaper, operat-
ing the printing presses which run 
between 10 p.m. and 3 a.m. Due to 
her disability, she needs to work in 
the daytime. The essential function 
of  her position, operating the print-
ing presses, requires that she work 
at night because the newspaper can-
not be printed during the daytime 
hours. Since the employer cannot 
modify her hours, it must consider 
whether it can reassign her to a dif-
ferent position.63
“The Supreme Court views EEOC 
interpretations of  this type as less than controlling 
authority but notes that they ‘constitute a body of  
experience and informed judgment to which courts 
and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’”64 
However, they do establish the guideposts for how 
the administrative agency responsible for enforcing 
the ADA views an employer’s responsibility in making 
adjustments to work schedules, and the types of  cases 
the EEOC might choose to pursue.
C.  The Supreme Court Standard from U.S. Airways, 
Inc v. Barnett
Although many aspects of  ADA have come 
before the Supreme Court,65 only one case addresses 
the reasonable accommodation requirement of  the 
act, U.S. Airways, Inc v. Barnett.66 “Robert Barnett 
injured his back while working as a cargo handler for 
U.S. Airways and transferred to a mailroom position 
that was less physically demanding. Two years later, 
Barnett’s position became open for seniority-based 
employee bidding, and Barnett learned that employees 
senior to him planned to bid for it.”67 At this point, 
he became “[c]oncerned that he would be forced to 
transfer back to his cargo position.”68 “Barnett asked 
U.S. Airways to accommodate his disability under the 
ADA by granting him an exemption from seniority 
rules so that he could remain in the mailroom. 
U.S. Airways denied Barnett’s request, and shortly 
thereafter Barnett lost his job.”69
The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed 
the district court’s grant of  sum-
mary judgment for U.S. Airways, 
but upon rehearing en banc, the 
full panel reversed and remanded. 
Rejecting the notion that a senior-
ity system always trumps reasonable 
accommodation considerations, the 
panel held that the presence of  a 
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seniority system is merely “a factor 
in the undue hardship analysis.” The 
panel demanded that courts under-
take a “case-by-case fact inten-
sive analysis” to ascertain whether 
the requested reassignment would 
impose an undue hardship on the 
employer. Reviewing the record, 
the court concluded that a trial was 
needed to resolve the factual dispute 
in Barnett’s case. 70
The Supreme Court decided in a 5-4 decision 
to vacate the Ninth Circuits en banc ruling and 
remanded.71
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer 
rejected both parties’ “radically dif-
ferent” views and adopted a compro-
mise position. He began his analysis 
by criticizing U.S. Airways’ interpre-
tation of  the ADA as requiring only 
“equal” (as opposed to preferen-
tial) treatment of  disabled workers. 
On the contrary, the ADA’s focus 
on “accommodation” implies the 
need for differential treatment, and 
therefore “preferences will some-
times prove necessary to achieve the 
Act’s basic equal opportunity goal.” 
Bolstering this interpretation is the 
fact that neither Congress nor the 
lower courts have suggested that 
neutral work policies—such as neu-
tral furniture budget rules—justify 
automatically exempting employ-
ers from ADA requirements. The 
Court then launched an equally dis-
approving attack on Barnett’s inter-
pretation of  “reasonable accommo-
dation” as “effective accommoda-
tion.” It is not enough, the Court 
wrote, for an employee to prove 
that her proposed accommodation 
will effectively meet her disability-
related needs. The employee must 
also demonstrate that the proposed 
accommodation “seems reason-
able on its face,” meaning that the 
accommodation would be reason-
able “in the run of  cases.”
Having concluded that the ADA 
may mandate preferential treat-
ment but requires proof  of  reason-
ableness, the Court then applied 
its analysis to the particularities of  
Barnett’s seniority system challenge. 
Concurring with other courts, the 
majority recognized the benefi-
cial effects of  seniority systems on 
employee-management relations: 
most notably, they cabin manage-
ment discretion, thereby inducing 
employee expectations of  fair, stan-
dardized treatment. It follows that 
employers and nondisabled employ-
ees would suffer greatly if  courts 
granted disabled employees auto-
matic superseniority rights for reas-
signment purposes under the ADA. 
Therefore, the Court held, it would 
not “ordinarily” be reasonable for 
an ADA job reassignment to trump 
seniority rules, and an employer’s 
showing that an assignment would 
violate the rules of  a seniority sys-
tem would warrant summary judg-
ment for the employer “in the run 
of  cases.”
But in keeping with its compro-
mise analysis, the Court also held 
that an employee could avoid sum-
mary judgment by demonstrating 
that “special circumstances” exist. 
Such special circumstances might 
include evidence that the seniority 
system already contains so many 
exceptions, or is altered unilater-
ally by the employer so frequently, 
that allowing an exception for dis-
abled employees would not signifi-
cantly alter employee expectations. 
Because Barnett had not yet had the 
opportunity to make such a show-
ing, the Court remanded the case 
for further proceedings.72
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The close 5-4 decision drew a concurrence 
and two dissents.73 Justice Souter’s dissent sided with 
Barnett, and argued in favor of  the Ninth Circuit’s 
case-by-case, fact-intensive approach, under which 
a seniority system would be merely one factor in 
a court’s analysis of  undue hardship limitation.74 
His dissent notes nothing in the ADA insulates 
seniority rules from the reasonable accommodation 
requirement which is in marked contrast to the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of  1967 (ADEA) 
and Title VII.75 Admitting that statutory silence is 
ambiguous, Justice Souter cited legislative history 
that used the “factor” formula as evidence to support 
his position that seniority rules do not automatically 
trump reassignment rights.76
However, the ADA is distinct from other 
civil rights statutes due to its emphasis on “reasonable 
accommodation.”77
Because Barnett was the Court’s 
first stab at interpreting this core 
term, one might have expected 
the opinion to address the special 
implications of  the phrase and the 
additional responsibilities and costs 
employers must assume to respond 
adequately to the distinct problem 
of  disability discrimination. Instead, 
the Court treated the ADA as more 
of  the same—as if  in drafting the 
ADA, Congress merely intended to 
add disability to the long list of  clas-
sifications already protected by Title 
VII and the ADEA, and to restate 
the Rehabilitation Act with only 
slight modification. Accordingly, 
the Court simply imported case law 
from other areas of  civil rights law 
and cited it as persuasive authority 
without fully justifying its applica-
tion to an ADA claim. . . .
To be sure, reasoning by analogy 
often drives our legal system for-
ward and is frequently an indispens-
able tool for statutory interpretation 
of  recently passed legislation. But a 
critical component of  reasoning by 
analogy is an explanation of  why it 
is appropriate to treat the issue at 
bar in accordance with the already-
decided issue. That the Barnett 
majority neglected to include this 
component leaves it open to the 
charge that it imply overlooked—
instead of  considering and reject-
ing— differences between the ADA 
and other antidiscrimination stat-
utes.
The analogies to other civil rights 
statutes are especially strained in 
light of  the evidence that Con-
gress intended the ADA to perform 
somewhat differently. As Justice 
Souter noted in his Barnett dissent, 
Title VII and the ADEA explicitly 
insulate seniority rules from the 
reasonable accommodation require-
ment; in marked contrast, the ADA 
does not. While the ADA’s silence 
certainly does not, on its own, 
mandate less deference to seniority 
systems under the ADA, legislative 
history suggests the possibility. The 
House and Senate Reports for the 
ADA explicitly limit an employer’s 
ability to use collective bargain-
ing agreements to avoid compli-
ance with the ADA. Moreover, the 
Senate Report explains that courts 
should consider a collective bargain-
ing agreement that reserves certain 
jobs for senior employees as only 
“a factor” in the decision whether 
to require the requested accom-
modation, and the House Report 
clarifies that “the agreement would 
not be determinative on the issue.” 
Barnett’s presumption that seniority 
rights trump the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodation provision seems to 
ignore these statements.78
“The Barnett Court’s holding is a relatively 
narrow one: an employer generally need not 
reassign a disabled employee as a reasonable 
accommodation if  doing so would conflict with the 
terms of  an employer’s seniority policy, unless special 
circumstances justify a different result.”79 As such, it 
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does not provide any clear black-letter law on which 
to analyze the facts of  Colwell v. Rite Aid. As Professor 
Befort concludes
The fundamental shortcoming of  
the Barnett decision . . . is in the 
Court’s failure to provide adequate 
guidance for future controver-
sies. The Court is imprecise with 
respect to the type of  “special cir-
cumstances” that will overcome the 
presumption of  unreasonableness 
in requiring a reassignment in the 
face of  a conflicting seniority sys-
tem. The Court does not explain 
how its ruling will impact the bal-
ance of  reassignment and other 
types of  transfer and assignment 
policies. The Court fails to articulate 
a clear allocation of  the burden of  
proof  responsibilities with respect 
to establishing a reasonable accom-
modation. And, finally, the Court 
falls short of  demarcating when, if  
ever, an accommodation should be 
deemed unreasonable by virtue of  
the fact that it requires the provision 
of  preferential treatment for the dis-
abled.
. . . .
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opin-
ion in Barnett provides an appropri-
ate touchstone for the unanswered 
questions relating to the reassign-
ment accommodation. According to 
[her], reassignment is unreasonable 
if  someone other than the disabled 
employee seeking a transfer has a 
legally enforceable entitlement to 
the position in question. This stan-
dard provides a predictable basis 
for determining Barnett’s special 
circumstances exception to the pre-
sumption favoring seniority systems. 
More broadly, this standard calls for 
an undue hardship-based test for 
determining whether reassignment 
should prevail over other types of  
transfer and assignment policies.80
D.  The Facts of  Colwell v. Rite Aid
Jeanette Colwell worked as a part-time 
cashier at a Rite-Aid pharmacy81. She would primarily 
work weekday shifts from 5 p.m. to 9 p.m.82 Her 
personal preferences were listed as 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. or 
5 p.m. to 9 p.m.83 During her employment, she was 
recognized by her superiors for good performance.84 
She subsequently developed a vision impairment 
that caused her to lose sight in her left eye; but this 
did not affect her ability to fully perform all of  the 
essential functions of  her job.85 Colwell informed her 
supervisor that her impairment made it dangerous 
and difficult for her to drive at night and requested 
that she be assigned only to the day shifts.86 Her 
supervisor denied her request, stating that allowing 
her to work only day shifts “wouldn’t be fair” to other 
employees.87 In the meantime, Colwell had family 
members drive her to and from work. Although 
she did not miss any work, Colwell claimed this 
arrangement posed a hardship to her family, and 
renewed her request for a day shift only schedule.88 
Rite-Aid continued to schedule her for a mixture of  
day and night shifts.89 After unsuccessfully engaging 
her union representative in the dialogue, Colwell 
ultimately submitted her resignation complaining of  
unfair treatment.90
The District Court granted summary 
judgment for Rite Aid on the ADA claim, concluding 
that while Colwell was an individual with a disability, 
she did not suffer any adverse employment action 
cognizable under the ADA.91 Specifically, the 
District Court found that because Colwell did not 
need any reasonable accommodation in order to 
perform the essential functions of  her job, Rite 
Aid had no obligation to consider her shift transfer 
request and “had no duty to accommodate her 
commute to work.”92 It viewed such a request as 
“tantamount to making an employer responsible for 
how an employee gets to work, a situation which 
expands the employer’s responsibility beyond the 
ADA’s intention.”93 On Colwell’s appeal, the Third 
Circuit reversed. It held that “as a matter of  law that 
changing her working schedule to day shifts in order 
to alleviate her disability-related difficulties in getting 
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to work is a type of  accommodation that the ADA 
contemplates.”94
E.		 A	Review	of	other	ADA	Commuting	
cases	preceding	Colwell
The year before Colwell, a different three 
judge panel in the Third Circuit ruled in the 
unpublished commuting related ADA case of  Parker 
v. Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc.95 In this case, Verizon had 
conformed to a number of  components of  Parker’s 
accommodation request, but denied a transfer to a 
location that would have shorted his commute as 
suggested by his physician.96 The Third Circuit stated 
that “Verizon’s failure to accommodate Parker by 
limiting his commute was not required.”97 With no 
Third Circuit precedent on point, the Court cited 
two cases from other circuits it found persuasive.98 
The first was Kvorjak v. Maine, holding that “the 
[employer’s] decision to reject an accommodation 
based on [the employee’s] commute does not 
demonstrate a disregard for its obligations under the 
ADA.”99 The facts and holding are distinguishable 
from both Parker and Colwell in that the basis for the 
courts decision was actually predicated on Kvorjak’s 
inability to perform the essential functions of  his job 
at home, not that the accommodation requested was 
unreasonable because it rose to the level of  undue 
hardship.100 The second case was LaResca v. American 
Telephone & Telegraph, holding that “commuting to and 
from work is not part of  the work environment that an 
employer is required to reasonably accommodate.”101 
LaResca suffered from bouts of  epilepsy and 
therefore could not drive himself  to work. Although 
he could nonetheless perform all essential functions 
of  the job, he was denied this accommodation under 
the New Jersey State Law Against Discrimination, 
not the ADA.102
Another example from a different circuit 
decision where the commute to work was excluded 
from the potential reasonable accommodations was 
in Florida. There, a school guidance counselor was 
denied a transfer to a closer school to reduce her 
commute in the case of  Salmon v. Dade County School 
Board.103 The Court reasoned that “the commute to 
and from work is an activity that is unrelated to and 
outside of  her job. While an employer is required to 
provide reasonable accommodations that eliminate 
barriers in the work environment, an employer is not 
required to eliminate those barriers which exist outside 
the work environment.”104
Before Colwell, the only recorded case 
going against precedent was the Second Circuit 
case Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, which held that 
employers must consider an accommodation related 
to the commute.105 Lyons was an attorney who was 
injured in a near fatal automobile accident, and 
her resulting condition severely limited her ability 
to walk long distances.106 Because her condition 
precludes her from taking public transportation, 
she asked her employer to pay for parking near her 
office and the courts in which she would practice.107 
The court reversed the summary judgment for the 
employer, holding that there is nothing “inherently 
unreasonable . . . in requiring an employer to furnish 
an otherwise qualified employee with assistance in 
getting to work,” and remanded the case back to the 
trial court to establish a factual record as to whether 
this requested accommodation rose to the level of  
undue hardship for the employer.108
The Third Circuit in Colwell found the 
infrequently cited fifteen year old Second Circuit 
Lyons reasoning to be persuasive, stating
At least one other court of  appeals 
has recognized this principle. In 
Lyons v. Legal Aid Society an employee 
who suffered severe physical impair-
ments due to a car accident that pre-
vented her from walking long dis-
tances sued her employer, Legal Aid, 
under the ADA in part for refusing 
to provide her financial assistance 
to pay for a parking space close to 
work. The Second Circuit held that 
the employee stated an ADA claim 
because, depending on the circum-
stances, such an accommodation 
might be reasonable. Although we 
voice no comment on that court’s 
holding that a reasonable accom-
modation could include funds to 
pay for an employee’s parking space, 
we agree with the court’s observa-
tion that “there is nothing inher-
ently unreasonable, given the stated 
views of  Congress and the agencies 
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responsible for overseeing the fed-
eral disability statutes, in requiring 
an employer to furnish an otherwise 
qualified disabled employee with 
assistance related to her ability to 
get to work.”109
F.		 The	Ninth	Circuit	follows	Colwell
In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
recently followed Colwell in Livingston v. Fred Meyers 
Stores, Inc.110 Similar to Jeanette Colwell, Michelle 
Livingston suffers from a vision impairment that 
affects her ability to safely drive and walk outside 
after dark.111
In the fall of  2005, Livingston’s 
supervisor granted Livingston’s 
request to work a modified schedule 
during the fall and winter months 
so that she could minimize driv-
ing after dark. In the fall of  2006, 
however, Fred Meyer Stores denied 
Livingston’s request for a modified 
schedule, even though the store had 
not experienced any hardship the 
previous year when Livingston was 
permitted to work under a modified 
schedule. In fact, Livingston was 
credited with increasing wine sales 
and improving the store’s ranking 
when she worked under the modi-
fied schedule.” When Livingston 
refused to work her scheduled shift, 
Fred Meyer fired her.112
The Court reversed the district court order 
granting summary judgment in favor of  the employer 
and held that that Livingston had “raised a triable 
issue of  material fact that Fred Meyer Stores failed to 
reasonably accommodate her and failed to engage in 
the interactive process in good faith.”113
IV.		Other	Circuits	Should	Adopt	the	
Holding	and	Reasoning	of	Colwell
A. The Legislative History of  the ADA Compels 
Adoption
Colwell utilizes legislative history to reach the 
conclusion that an accommodation for a disability 
can extend to the workplace commute. It notes
Congress acknowledged that “mod-
ified work schedules can provide 
useful accommodations” and noted 
that “persons who may require 
modified work schedules are per-
sons with mobility impairments 
who depend on a public transpor-
tation system that is not currently 
fully accessible.” …Thus, the ADA 
does not strictly limit the breadth 
of  reasonable accommodations to 
address only those problems that 
an employee has in performing her 
work that arise once she arrives at 
the workplace.114
When introducing the ADA, cosponsor 
Senator D’Amato specifically noted the daily struggles 
that people with disabilities face in getting to and from 
work.115 “The barriers the disabled must overcome 
in order to meet basic needs are many. Activities 
accomplished with ease by most— communicating, 
commuting, or entering the workplace—are often 
significant hurdles for those with disabilities. This 
legisiation (sic), Mr. President, will break down these 
barriers once and for all.”116 Congress also considered 
that improvements to public transportation would 
help people with disabilities commute to work.117 
Also, it knew that handicapped parking spaces118 
and architectural improvements to the workplace 
such as ramps119 would make it possible for people 
with disabilities to get into the workplace. Clearly, by 
enacting the ADA, Congress was concerned not only 
with accommodating workers once they somehow 
miraculously arrived inside the workplace, but they 
were also cognizant they needed to help people with 
disabilities to arrive at exterior of  and to enter the 
workplace. Commuting to work is an important 
prerequisite to reducing the unemployment rate for 
people with disabilities, one of  the key aims for the 
ADA.120
B. Adopting Colwell is Consistent with Current 
Workplace Employment Trends and is Sound 
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Public Policy
It is well established that “[i]ssues related to 
getting to work keep many potential employees with 
disabilities from working to their fullest potential,”121 
and that the ADA was intended to be construed 
broadly.122 Since the employment objectives of  the 
ADA were never achieved,123 construing the statute 
to cover situations such as those that arose in Colwell 
can help eliminate a key barrier to accomplishing 
those goals.
Outside of  the realm of  ADA 
accommodations, employers have been 
accommodating the needs of  their employees with 
more workplace flexibility. For example, a recent 
study found that
[t]here are two changes in the provi-
sion of  flexibility between 2008 and 
1998: 79 percent of  employers now 
allow at least some employees to 
periodically change their arrival and 
departure time, up from 68 percent. 
In addition, 47 percent of  employ-
ers allow at least some employees 
to move from full-time to part-time 
work and back again while remain-
ing in the same position or level, 
down from 57 percent.124
Considering work hour flexibility as 
a reasonable accommodation for people with 
disabilities would not be an unusual accommodation 
since it is offered to a large proportion of  employees 
including those without disabilities. Public policy 
would be served by a broad adoption of  Colwell.
C.  Employers Retain the Undue Hardship Defense
Holding that as a matter of  law that 
issues related to the workplace commute must be 
considered within the realm of  possible reasonable 
accommodations does not mean that the employer 
must automatically accommodate requests such as 
those made by Jeanette Colwell; employers still retain 
the undue hardship defense.125 “An accommodation is 
not reasonable if  it would impose an ‘undue hardship’ 
on the employer’s business.”126 As described in Section 
II.B supra, this term ‘undue hardship” is defined in 
the statute. “The cost for an employer must be more 
than de minimus before the undue hardship test will 
be satisfied. . . . Each case must be decided on an 
individual basis.”127
In addition to cost, employer concerns in 
providing accommodations also include a threat to 
employee morale if  some workers are provided with 
more flexibility in some workplace rules.
With respect to the impact on other 
employees, the undue hardship test 
will not be satisfied if  the disruption 
to them results from fears or preju-
dices towards the individual’s dis-
ability and not from the provision 
of  the accommodation. Nor is there 
an undue hardship if  the accom-
modation negatively impacts on the 
morale of  the other employees but 
does not affect those employees’ 
ability to perform their jobs.128
The courts have already addressed the issue 
of  when changes to work schedules such as changing 
shifts for non-commute related commutes rise to 
the level of  undue hardship,129 so determining when 
this category of  request reaches the level of  undue 
hardship could be easily integrated with existing 
law and employer practices. Also, this reasonable 
accommodation-undue hardship determination 
requires close attention to the specific facts related to 
workplace characteristics for both the employer and 
the employee.130 For example, more will be expected 
of  larger employers, and less of  smaller employers.131 
Because of  the fact specific nature of  the inquiry, 
juries should be the ones making the determination 
of  what constitutes undue hardship instead of  judges 
making a determination about reasonableness as a 
matter of  law.132
D.  Engaging in the Interactive Process on Work 
Schedules Makes Good Business Sense
Employers have been providing flexible work 
schedules to their entire employee population on an 
increasingly frequent basis.133 The benefits of  these 
flexible work schedules benefit both the employee 
and the employer. One example is the Results-Only 
Work Environment (ROWE) program implemented 
at electronics retailer Best Buy. “The premise of
ROWE is that employees can do ‘whatever 
they want whenever they want as long as the work 
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gets done.’”134 Although the program was in response 
to employee feedback, it also provided benefits to the 
employer.135 “ROWE teams at Best Buy report an 
average 3.2 percent lower voluntary turnover rates 
than non-ROWE teams and employees report that 
ROWE has changed their personal and work lives 
for the better. ROWE teams are also experiencing an 
average 35% increase in productivity.”136 Other studies 
have also demonstrated the link between workplace 
flexibility, increased employee engagement, and 
reduced turnover.137 Another example is that research 
suggests that providing employees more flexibility 
over their working patterns is likely to improve their 
health.138 The improved outcomes were in the areas 
of  “systolic blood pressure and heart rate, tiredness, 
mental health, sleep duration, sleep quality and 
alertness and self-rated health status,”139 and was 
“also noted in well-being, such as co-workers’ social 
support and sense of  community.”140
Since technology and workplace expectations 
change, employers should not rely on either past 
precedent or how they decided internally in a similar 
situation in the past. They should engage in the 
interactive process with each request for flexibility. 
Under the ADA, it is “clear that the [undue-hardship] 
burden should be viewed as dynamic, one that 
will change over time depending on what courts 
and juries consider appropriate as technology and 
social expectations change. If  the social context 
of  the statute has any significance at all, it is that 
accommodations that seemed beyond the pale 
yesterday will be considered ordinary tomorrow.”141
V.	Conclusion
In the introduction, this author admits 
to using hyperbole in choosing to say that Colwell 
“breaks new ground.” Although it is a break from the 
case law, the subsequent golf  analogy of  “replacing a 
divot” is also introduced to characterize the change 
as a shift back to the original meaning and intent of  
the ADA as passed by Congress and signed into law 
by President Bush. Colwell and Livingston are simply 
returns to an interpretation of  the statute in harmony 
with Congress’s broad goal under Title I of  the ADA 
in helping enable people with disabilities participate 
in the job market.
Judge Harold Leventhal is credited with saying 
that citing legislative history is akin to “looking over 
a crowd and picking out your friends.”142 However, 
accommodating needs related to the workplace 
commute are not circumstances in which there are 
conflicting messages in the legislative history. There 
is no evidence that Congress intended to preclude 
the commute to the workplace from consideration 
as a possible reasonable accommodation; legislative 
history and the text of  the statute both provide 
evidence to the contrary. Judge Slovitier was right 
when he wrote in Colwell that “changing Colwell’s 
working hour schedule . . . is a type of  accommodation 
the ADA contemplates. The statute expressly says 
so.”143
The ADAAA of  2008 reduced the threshold 
for coverage under the act back to Congress’s original 
intent two decades earlier.144 With increased coverage, 
I anticipate that there will be more opportunity for 
employers, and ultimately the courts to decide whether 
flexibility related to the workplace commute can be 
accommodated without creating undue hardship on 
the employer.145 Employers should engage in the 
interactive process with employees or applicants with 
disabilities that have difficulty with commuting for 
two reasons. It not only makes good business sense, 
but is also what Congress commands.
Endnotes
1 Frederick Melkey is a part-time evening student 
at the University of  Connecticut School of  Law. 
He has a Bachelors of  Science Degree in Industrial 
Engineering from Purdue University and a Masters of  
Business Administration from the Anderson School 
of  Management at the University of  New Mexico. 
He was a founding board member of  the Center for 
Corporate Equality. Over the past seven years, he has 
managed the Affirmative Action Program for two 
Fortune 500 companies. In that capacity, one of  his 
responsibilities has been to ensure compliance with § 
503 of  the Rehabilitation Act.
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
3 Disability Discrimination, u.s. equAl eMP’t 
oPPortuNity CoMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/
types/disability.cfm (last visited Dec. 8, 2010).
4 Id. (emphasis added).
THE MODERN AMERICAN36
5 E.g. Charles A. Sullivan, Getting to Work, 
tHe WorkPlACe Prof Blog, (Aug. 3, 2010), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_
blog/2010/08/getting-to-work.html (“Both cases 
implicate the EEOC’s guideline which indicate that 
the ADA does not require an employer to make 
accommodations primarily for the employee’s 
personal benefit. Now, getting to work is not exactly 
for personal benefit, but both cases illustrate the 
occasional difficulty of  drawing the work/personal 
line. Certainly, many employers view their workers’ 
commutation as their own responsibility.”).
6 Salmon v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F. Supp. 2d 
1157, 1163 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
7 Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 505 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (holding that “the ADA contemplates that 
employers may need to make reasonable shift changes 
in order to accommodate a disabled employee’s 
disability-related difficulties in getting to work”).
8 Id. at 505.
9 Parker v. Verizon Pa., Inc., 309 Fed. App’x. 551, 
561 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[h]owever, Verizon’s failure to 
accommodate Parker by limiting his commute was not 
required.”); see Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 53 (1st 
Cir. 2001) (holding that “the [employer’s] decision to 
reject an accommodation based on [the employee’s] 
commute does not demonstrate a disregard for its 
obligations under the ADA.”); see also LaResca v. Am. 
Tel. & Tel., 161 F. Supp. 2d 323, 333 (D.N.J. 2001) 
(holding that “commuting to and from work is not 
part of  the work environment that an employer is 
required to reasonably accommodate.”).
10 E.g., Fredric C. Leffler & Jurate Schwartz, Third 
Circuit Holds that the ADA Can Obligate an Employer 
to Reasonably Accommodate an Employee’s Disability-
Related Difficulties in Getting to Work, MArtiNdAle.
CoM (June 2, 2010), http://www.martindale.com/
labor-employment-law/article_Proskauer-Rose-
LLP_1039204.html. Lisa Carey-Davis & Ashley 
G. Eddy, Are Your Employees Asking for too Much? 
Recent Cases Highlight the Challenges Employers Face 
When Asked to Accommodate an Employee’s Disability, 
sCHiffHArdiNllP (April 20, 2010), http://www.
schiffhardin.com/publications/labor_apr20_10/
labor_apr20_10index.html; Michael Soltis, Alleviating 
Commuting Woes as a Reasonable Accommodation Under 
the ADA, disABility, leAve & HeAltH MgMt. 
Blog (July 29, 2010), http://www.disabilityleavelaw.
com/2010/07/articles/ada/alleviating-commuting-
woes-as-a-reasonable-accommodation-under-the-
ada/.
11 Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 388 Fed. 
App’x. 738 (9th Cir. 2010).
12 Charles A. Sullivan, Getting to Work, tHe 
WorkPlACe Prof Blog, (Aug. 3, 2010), http://
l a w p r o f e s s o r s . t y p e p a d . c o m / l a b o r p r o f _
blog/2010/08/getting-to-work.html.
13 Id.
14 See infra Part III.E.
15 See infra Part II.C; see also Jill C. Anderson, Just 
Semantics: The Lost Readings of  the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 117 yAle l.J. 992, 1000–07 (2008) 
(detailing the courts’ failure to notice ambiguity in the 
‘regarded-as’ prong of  the definition of  a disability).
16 See generally u.s. golf AssoCiAtioN, http://www.
usga.org/etiquette/tips/Golf-Etiquette-101/ (part 
of  golf  etiquette is to repair the ground damaged 
by either a player’s club or ball, colloquially called a 
“divot” by golfers).
17 sAMuel estreiCHer & MiCHAel C. HArPer, CAses 
ANd MAteriAls oN eMPloyMeNt disCriMiNAtioN ANd 
eMPloyMeNt lAW 491 (3d ed. 2008).
18 Id. (referring to H.r. reP No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 32 
(1990)).
19 The Employment Situation-November 2010, 
BureAu of lABor stAtistiCs, u.s. deP’t of lABor, 
18 (2010), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives/empsit_12032010.pdf  (current disability 
unemployment statistics are regularly updated and 
posted at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.
t06.htm).
20 U.S. Department Seeks Public Input to Strengthen 
Disability Regulations, u.s. deP’t of lABor (June 9, 
2010), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/
ofccp/ofccp20101015.htm.
21 estreiCHer, supra note 16, at 492.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 493.
27 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–795(i) (2000).
28 estreiCHer, supra note 16, at 493.
29 Id. (emphasis added).
30 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(2) (2000).
31 estreiCHer, supra note 16, at 493.
32 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
SPRING 2011 37
33 Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and 
Due Hardship, 62 flA. l. rev. 1119, 1131 (2010).
34 estreiCHer, supra note 16, at 493 (“[b]y enacting 
the Title I of  the ADA in 1990, however, congress 
took the additional step of  imposing on all employers 
subject to Title VII the duty not to discriminate 
against any ‘qualified individual with a disability.’”); 
Americans with Disabilities Act of  1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
35 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516-17 (2004).
36 Americans with Disabilities Act of  1990, Pub 
L. No. 101-336, § 102(a), 104 Stat. 327, 331 (1990) 
(emphasis added).
37 Id. at 332.
38 estreiCHer, supra note 16, at 493.
39 ADA Amendments Act of  2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008); see 42 U.S.C.A. § 
12101 (2009) (quoting to U.S.C.A. since this came 
into effect after 2006.)
40 Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA 
Amendment Acts of  2008, 103 NW. u. l. rev. Colloquy 
217, 229 (2008).
41 Id. at 217-18.
42 ADA Amendments Act of  2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, § 2(b)(2), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008) 
(rejecting the requirement enunciated by the Supreme 
Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 
(1999) and its companion cases that whether an 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity is 
to be determined with reference to the ameliorative 
effects of  mitigating measures); § 2(b)(3), 122 Stat. 
at 3554 (rejecting the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) 
with regard to coverage under the third prong of  the 
definition of  disability and to reinstate the reasoning 
of  the Supreme Court in School Board of  Nassau County, 
Florida v. Airline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) which set forth 
a broad view of  the third prong of  the definition 
of  handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of  1973); 
§ 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3554 (rejecting the standards 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 
(2002), that the terms “substantially” and “major” in 
the definition of  disability under the ADA “need to 
be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard 
for qualifying as disabled,” and that to be substantially 
limited in performing a major life activity under the 
ADA “an individual must have an impairment that 
prevents or severely restricts the individual from 
doing activities that are of  central importance to 
most people’s daily lives); § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. at 3554 
(conveying congressional intent that the standard 
created by the Supreme Court in the case of  Toyota 
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 
184 (2002) for “substantially limits”, and applied by 
lower courts in numerous decisions, has created an 
inappropriately high level of  limitation necessary 
to obtain coverage under the ADA, to convey that 
it is the intent of  Congress that the primary object 
of  attention in cases brought under the ADA should 
be whether entities covered under the ADA have 
complied with their obligations, and to convey that 
the question of  whether an individual’s impairment 
is a disability under the ADA should not demand 
extensive analysis).
43 § 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. at 3554.
44 Long, supra note 39, at 228 (“[b]y amending 
the ADA’s definition of  disability, Congress has 
assured that more individuals will qualify as having 
disabilities.”).
45 Id. at 225.
46 Id. (quoting ADA Amendments Act of  2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 6(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3557 
(2008)).
47 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2006). This article 
focuses on the employment Title of  the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, Title I, §§ 12111-12117. 
Therefore, an “employer” will be the “covered entity” 
covered by the act. Id. at § 12111(2) (“[t]he term 
‘covered entity’ means an employer, employment 
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management 
committee.”). An employer must reach a particular 
size and scope before they are covered by the statute. 
Id. at § 12111(5)(A) (“[t]he term ‘employer’ means a 
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce 
who has 15 or more employees for each working 
day in each of  20 or more calendar weeks in the 
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent 
of  such person, except that, for two years following 
the effective date of  this subchapter, an employer 
means a person engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has 25 or more employees for each 
working day in each of  20 or more calendar weeks in 
the current or preceding year, and any agent of  such 
person.”). There are several exceptions for the federal 
governments and non-profit clubs. Id. at § 12111(5)
(B) (“[t]he term ‘employer’ does not include— (i) 
THE MODERN AMERICAN38
the United States, a corporation wholly owned by 
the government of  the United States, or an Indian 
tribe; or (ii) a bona fide private membership club 
(other than a labor organization) that is exempt from 
taxation under section 501(c) of  Title 26.”). Other 
titles cover state and local government activities 
and public transportation (Title II), business and 
non-profit providers of  public accommodations 
(Title III), and telecommunications (Title IV). See A 
Guide to Disability Rights Laws, u.s. deP’t of JustiCe, 
(Sep. 2005), available at http://www.ada.gov/cguide.
htm#anchor62335.
48 Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—
Reasonable Accommodation and Resistance Under the ADA, 
27 Berkeley J. eMP. & lAB. l. 59, 60-61 (2008) 
(footnote omitted).
49 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (emphasis 
added).
50 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006) (emphasis added).
51 Id. at § 12111(9); Weber, supra note 32, at 1129–30. 
(citing examples in n. 32, “[e]ven those who disagree 
with this proposition seem ultimately to change their 
minds when they consider the text and structure 
of  the law.”); see, e.g., Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (Newman, 
J., concurring) (“[T]he ADA contains a definition 
of  ‘reasonable accommodation’ [in § 12111(9)]. 
However, this definition explains only the sorts of  
modifications and assistance that are included within 
the phrase ‘reasonable accommodation’ and provides 
no guidance as to whether, or to what extent, the 
cost[s] of  such items are relevant to a determination 
of  their reasonableness.”).
52 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2006) (emphasis added).
53 Weber, supra note 32, at 1130.
54 Id. (footnotes omitted).
55 Id. at 1131.
56 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2006).
57 Weber, supra note 32, at 1131.
58 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (establishing 
the rule that when an agency is interpreting a statute, 
and it is ambiguous or silent on the precise issue, 
courts must accept the agency’s interpretation as long 
as it is a reasonable one. “When a challenge to an 
agency construction of  a statutory provision, fairly 
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of  the 
agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable 
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the 
challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges—
who have no constituency—have a duty to respect 
legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The 
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of  such 
policy choices and resolving the struggle between 
competing views of  the public interest are not judicial 
ones.”); U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) 
(holding that when Congress has explicitly left a gap 
for an agency to fill, any ensuing regulation is binding 
in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary 
or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to 
the statute).
59 Weber, supra note 32, at 1140; see id. n. 86 (“29 
C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (2009). The following subsection 
repeats the statutory prohibition on denying 
employment opportunities to otherwise qualified 
applicants or employees with disabilities based on 
the need to make reasonable accommodations. § 
1630.9(b). Other subsections provide that failure to 
receive technical assistance is no excuse for failure 
to accommodate and that a person with a disability 
need not accept an accommodation but may lose the 
status of  a qualified individual if  unable to perform 
the essential functions of  the job without the 
accommodation. § 1630.9(c)-(d).”).
60 Weber, supra note 32, at 1140.
61 Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1) (2010); 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(p) (2010).
62 Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation 
and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, u.s. equAl eMP’t oPPortuNity CoMM’N (Oct. 
17, 2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
accommodation.html (emphasis added).
63 Id.
64 Weber, supra note 32, at 1141 n.90 (indicating 
that although the interpretive guidance does not 
necessarily warrant Chevron deference, they at the 
very least warrant Skidmore deference); Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“[w]
e consider that the rulings, interpretations and 
opinions of  the Administrator under this Act, while 
not controlling upon the courts by reason of  their 
authority, do constitute a body of  experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance. The weight of  such a 
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity 
of  its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
SPRING 2011 39
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if  lacking power to control.”).
65 ADA Amendments Act of  2008, supra note 41.
66 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
67 Leading Cases: III. Federal Statutes and Regulations, 
116 HArv. l. rev. 342, 342-43 (2002) (footnotes 
omitted).
68 Id. at 343 (footnote omitted).
69 Id. (footnotes omitted).
70 Id. (footnotes omitted).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 343-45 (footnotes omitted).
73 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
74 Leading Cases: III. Federal Statutes and Regulations, 
116 HArv. l. rev. 342, 347 (2002) (footnotes 
omitted).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 347-49.
78 Id.
79 Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and 
Reassignment Under the Americans with Disablities Act: 
Answers, Questions and Suggested Solutions After U.S. 
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 45 Ariz. l. rev. 931, 983 
(2003).
80 Id. at 983-84.
81 Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 498 
(2010).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 499.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 500.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 504.
95 Parker v. Verizon Pa., Inc., 309 Fed. App’x. 551 
(3d Cir. 2009).
96 Id. at 561.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2001).
100 Id. (“[T]he record cannot support a finding that 
he is able to perform the essential functions of  the 
claims adjudicator position at his home.”).
101 LaResca v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 161 F. Supp. 2d 323, 
333 (D.N.J. 2001).
102 Id. at 334.
103 Salmon v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F.Supp.2d 1157, 
1162 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
104 Id. at 1163.
105 Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc., 68 F.3d 1512, 1517 (2d 
Cir. 1995).
106 Id. at 1513.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1517.
109 Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 505 
(2010).
110 See generally Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 
388 Fed. App’x. 738 (9th Cir. 2010).
111 Id. at 739.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 742.
114 Colwell, 602 F.3d at 505 (citation omitted); H.R. 
Rep No. 101-485(II), at 62-63 (1990), as reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 345.
115 101 CoNg. reC. s933 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1989) 
(remarks by Sen. D’Amato)
116 Id. (emphasis added).
117 Hearings: Americans with Disabilities Act, To Establish 
a Clear and Comprehensive Prohibition of  Disccrimination on 
the Basis of  Disability, Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp. 
(1989) (statement of  John Winske) (“[i]t should also 
be noted that if  the Americans with Disabilities Act 
is passed, it will increase employment opportunities 
for the disabled. This increase in employment 
would result in more people using intercity buses to 
commute to work. Most disabled people, particularly 
those beginning work, will not have the money to 
purchase a vehicle, and will thus have to rely on 
public transportation.”).
118 Oversight Hearing on H.R. 4498, Americans with 
Disabilities Act of  1988: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Select Educ. of  the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st 
Cong. 116 (1988) (statement of  Rima Sutton, Service 
Coordinator for the Multiple Sclerosis Society) 
(“[d]isabled people depend greatly on provided 
handicapped parking spaces. But every day I see 
spaces filled by cars without handicap plates or 
stickers. If  a disabled person can’t park their car, [in 
an accessible spot] they can’t get out [of  there car].”).
THE MODERN AMERICAN40
119 Joint Hearing on H.R. 2273, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of  1989: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Select Educ. and Emp’t Opportunities of  the Comm. on 
Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. 42 (1989) (statement of  
Reverend Jesse Jackson, President, National Rainbow 
Coalition) (“[i]n a sense that there are things you can 
anticipate. We know that we need riding ramps for 
public transportation; you can anticipate that, that the 
people need access to buildings for work or living. We 
can anticipate that.”).
120 See supra Part I.B. (the unemployment rate for 
people with disabilities was a key part of  the rationale 
for the passage of  the Title I of  ADA).
121 Basas, supra note 47, at 115.
122 See supra Part II.C.
123 Id.
124 James T. Bond, Ellen Galinsky, Nicole Giuntoli, 
Stacy S. Kim & Kelly Sakai, 2008 National Study 
of  Employers, fAMilies ANd Work iNst., 6 (2008), 
http://www.familiesandwork.org/site/research/
reports/2008nse.pdf.
125 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402 
(2002) (“[o]nce the plaintiff  has made this showing 
[that the accommodation is reasonable on its face], the 
defendant/employer then must show special (typically 
case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue 
hardship in the particular circumstances.”).
126 rutH Colker & AdAM A. MilANi, federAl 
disABility lAW iN A NutsHell 103 (4th ed. 2010).
127 Id. at 104–05.
128 Id. at 105 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (2010)).
129 E.g.. Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of  
Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894, 899 n.9 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (“[a]s the district judge noted, ‘the only 
imaginable accommodation would be an open-ended 
schedule that would allow Jovanovic to come and go 
as he pleased.’ We would be hard-pressed to imagine 
a manufacturing facility that could operate effectively 
when its employees are essentially permitted to set 
their own work hours, and we thus reject such a 
schedule as an unreasonable accommodation under 
the circumstances of  this case.”) (citation omitted); see 
Turco v. Hoescht Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 
(5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting as unreasonable a plaintiff ’s 
request to work day-time instead of  rotating shifts).
130 Weber, supra note 32, at 1151.
131 Id.
132 Id. (“[a]s Professors Pamela S. Karlan and 
George Rutherglen noted, the accommodations 
determination process ‘resembles, in some important 
respects, the common-law process of  developing and 
applying standards of  negligence.’ The use of  juries 
is a particularly apt means to be certain that the law 
conforms to widespread understandings of  what 
constitutes an undue hardship for an employer and 
that finders of  fact will update that understanding as 
technology and social attitudes advance.”) (footnotes 
omitted).
133 See supra Part IV.B.
134 Catalyst D&I Practices, Best Buy—Enhanced 
Flexibility: Results-Only Work Environment at Best Buy (Sep. 
2010), http://www.catalyst.org/publication/437/
best-buyenhanced-flexibility-results-only-work-
environment-at-best-buy.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Chiung-Ya Tang & Shelly MacDermid 
Wadsworth, Time and Workplace Flexibility, fAMilies 
ANd Work iNst. 2008 NAt’l study of CHANgiNg 
WorkforCes, 3 (2008), http://www.familiesandwork.
org/site/research/reports/time_work_flex.pdf  (“[e]
mployers that provide flexibility and that have more 
supportive supervisors have employees who are more 
satisfied with their jobs, more engaged, more likely 
to remain and in better mental health. As has been 
found in previous National Studies of  the Changing 
Workforce, there is considerable evidence that 
supportive supervisors and access to flexibility are 
strongly related to employee behavior that is important 
to employers. In 2008, employees with both above-
average supervisor support AND flexibility are more 
than twice as likely to report high job engagement 
and job satisfaction as employees with below-average 
support and flexibility. Employees with above-
average flexibility are less likely to report that they 
are looking for another job. More than three quarters 
of  employees with above-average flexibility AND 
support say that they are “not at all” likely to look 
for another job, compared with 57% of  employees 
with low flexibility. Employees with BOTH more 
flexibility and support are also significantly more 
likely to report good mental health.”).
138 Stephen Miller, Flexible Work Might Improve 
Employees’ Health, soC’y for HuMAN res. MgMt. (Mar. 
10, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/
benefits/Articles/Pages/FlexWorkHealth.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2010).
139 Id.
SPRING 2011 41
140 Id.
141 Weber, supra note 32, at 1149.
142 Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of  
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 
ioWA l. rev. 195, 214 (1983).
143 Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 504 
(2010).
144 See supra Part II.C. See supra note 41.
145 Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2010, u.s. 
equAl eMP’t oPPortuNity CoMM’N, http://www.
eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2011) (there is evidence beginning 
to emerge that the ADAAA has resulted in increased 
coverage. Recently released EEOC charge statistics 
reveal that the charges under the ADA have been 
growing faster than other forms of  discrimination. 
Total ADA related charges have grown by 22.7% 
from Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to FY2010, while total 
EEOC charges for all forms of  discrimination grew 
only 4.5% during the same time frame. ADA charges 
in FY2010 accounted for 25.2% of  all EEOC charges, 
up from 20.4% in FY2008. ).
THE MODERN AMERICAN42
RACE	AND	IMMIGRATION	LAW:	
A	TROUBLING	MARRIAGE
By Lisa Sandoval1
“The differences of  race added greatly to 
the diffi culties of  the situation . . . . [T]hey remained 
strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, 
and adhering to the customs and usages of  their own 
country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate 
with our people, or to make any change in their habits 
or modes of  living. As they grew in numbers each 
year the people . . . saw . . . great danger that at no 
distant day that portion of  our country would be 
overrun by them, unless prompt action was taken to 
restrict their immigration.” – Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 18892
Introduction
Immigration from Mexico should be curtailed 
because it threatens the United States by eroding 
Anglo-Protestant culture. This thesis is advanced in 
Who are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity3
by Samuel Huntington, one of  the most widely 
cited political scientists on international relations.4
Huntington warns that Hispanic immigration to 
the United States threatens to transform the nation 
into “a country of  two languages, two cultures, and 
two peoples.”5 The current immigration debate in 
the United States shows that many people support 
Huntington’s proposition, as evidenced in Arizona 
Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070).6 Signed into law on 
April 23, 2010, SB 1070 is aimed at identifying and 
deporting “illegal immigrants.”7
In an attempt to facilitate this mission, 
the law requires local law enforcement offi cials to 
stop and demand identifi cation from anyone they 
“reasonably suspect” is in the country illegally.8
This of  course begs the question, what gives rise to 
“reasonable suspicion”? What does it mean to “look 
illegal”? For that matter, what does it mean to look 
“American”? The answers to these questions reveal 
the troubling marriage between race and immigration 
law. However, the underlying racism fueling SB 
1070 does not represent a new trend. In fact, U.S. 
immigration law uses racial difference as an indicator 
of  non-belonging and thus reifi es notions of  racial 
inferiority.
Ian Haney Lopez, a prominent critical race 
scholar, argues that the law not only refl ects but 
constructs social prejudice.9 The law thus becomes 
an instrument in constructing and reinforcing 
racial subordination.10 In this paper, I explore how 
immigration law, in particular, constructs notions 
of  racial inferiority by associating racial difference 
with noncitizen, or “illegal”, immigration status. 
Within the immigration law framework, racially 
different noncitizens are pitted against a seemingly 
homogenous group of  “American” citizens.
As Jennifer Gordon and R.A. Lenhardt point 
out, citizenship has been used to refer to a whole 
host of  different ideas, including nationality, forms 
of  political participation, and entitlement to certain 
rights.11 I use citizenship to refer to the entitlement to 
belong. Within this defi nition of  citizenship, belonging 
encompasses both cultural and racial belonging in a 
nation. I recognize that in practice citizenship does 
not always grant automatic belonging in society. 
Instead, I believe that citizenship is used by those 
in power to determine who is worthy of  belonging, 
which history has revealed is a determination that 
largely turns on race.
As Gordon and Lenhardt also discuss, by 
defi ning inclusion, citizenship also defi nes exclusion.12
I argue that immigration law historically relied on 
citizenship to exclude noncitizens, who have been 
deemed unable to assimilate due to their race. In order 
to gain legal status as a citizen—in order to belong—
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the noncitizen must assimilate to the citizen, who was 
legally defined as white until 1952.13 Based on this 
history, immigration law today continues to use racial 
difference as an indicator of  non-belonging, reifying 
notions of  racial inferiority in the process.
Kevin Johnson believes racism is visible in 
immigration law because society transfers its racism 
toward domestic minorities to noncitizens.14 While 
overt racism toward minority citizens is much more 
controversial, racism towards noncitizens can be 
masked by facially neutral gripes about noncitizens’ 
failure to assimilate, frustration over linguistic 
barriers, or intolerance of  “criminals”15 who have 
broken immigration laws. Johnson’s transference 
theory helps explain why immigration laws continue 
to justify a focus on racial difference to support race 
neutral policies like protecting national security and 
preserving American culture.16 The result of  this kind 
of  immigration law and policy is what Mae M. Ngai 
titles “alien citizenship.” As she explains, an “alien 
citizen” is a U.S. Citizen “by virtue of  her birth in the 
United States but whose citizenship is suspect, if  not 
denied, on account of  the racialized identity of  her 
immigrant ancestry.”17
I argue that SB 1070 provides a contemporary 
example of  the way immigration law constructs racial 
difference as an indicator of  non-belonging, reifying 
notions of  racial inferiority. Specifically, SB 1070 
overtly attempts to exclude unwanted immigrants 
and does so by mandating racial profiling. Arizona’s 
new law illustrates Johnson’s theory of  transference 
as well as Ngai’s concept of  “alien citizenship.” SB 
1070 results from the evolution of  this nation’s 
immigration laws. Particularly important in shaping 
SB 1070 is the plenary power doctrine, which currently 
affords the political branches unfettered discretion 
in regulating immigration. As a result of  this broad 
discretion, noncitizens are stripped of  important 
constitutional rights under federal immigration law. 
SB 1070 employs a similar type of  constitutional 
rights-stripping.
Section One of  this paper highlights four 
moments in history that illustrate the way immigration 
law constructs race. Section Two discusses which 
constitutional protections are denied to noncitizens 
in the immigration context. Section Three illustrates 
how constitutional rights-stripping of  noncitizens 
leads to increases in racial profiling, both within and 
outside of  the immigration context. Section Four 
argues that SB 1070 is a product of  this nation’s 
historical racism towards immigrants. This section 
frames SB 1070 within Johnson’s transference theory 
and Ngai’s idea of  alien citizenship. Finally, Section 
Five provides recommendations for dismantling the 
underlying racism present in immigration law.
Section	One:	A	History	of	Racism	in	
Immigration	Law
Perhaps more alarming than SB 1070’s express 
sanction of  racial profiling is the consistent theme 
of  racism present in the history of  immigration law. 
The evolution of  U.S. immigration law demonstrates 
the political and judicial branches’ repeated use of  
race to deny different groups citizenship status. This 
trend illustrates Gordon and Lenhardt’s theory that 
citizenship defines exclusion, not merely inclusion. 
While immigration law has changed over time, what 
remains the same are notions of  racial inferiority 
associated with noncitizens. The history of  U.S. 
immigration law reveals many instances of  race being 
used to signify non-belonging, but I focus on four 
moments: 1) Dred Scott v. Sandford,18 2) Chae Chan Ping 
v. United States19 (the Chinese Exclusion Act case), 
3) the “naturalization cases,” and 4) the Mexican 
Repatriation and Operation Wetback.
Dred Scott Sets the Stage
Immigration to the United States is a 
phenomenon that traces to the founding of  the 
nation.20 While immigration was largely unregulated 
during roughly the first 100 years of  the United 
States’ existence, by 1882 the Chinese Exclusion Act 
(“the Act”) was one of  the first major attempts at 
controlling the flow of  people into the country.21 The 
legal precedent established in Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States,22 a case arising from the Act, created the legal 
framework for immigration law in the United States. 
However, it is important to understand how Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, decided thirty-three years earlier, set 
the stage for Chae Chan Ping by first characterizing 
citizenship in terms of  racial belonging and 
assimilability.
In Dred Scott v. Sandford23 the United States 
Supreme Court held that African Americans, even 
those born free, were not U.S. Citizens.24 The Court 
denied Dred Scott the ability to sue in federal 
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court because it deemed that he was not a citizen 
of  the United States.25 The Supreme Court turned 
to race to determine whether the original framers 
intended to include slaves within the meaning of  
the Constitution.26 The Court presented exhaustive 
evidence of  racial animosity 
towards African Americans 
in order to justify not granting 
them citizenship status under 
the Constitution:
We refer to these his-
torical facts for the 
purpose of  showing 
the fixed opinions concerning that race, 
upon which the statesmen of  that 
day spoke and acted. It is necessary 
to do this, in order to determine 
whether the general terms used 
in the Constitution of  the United 
States, as to the rights of  man 
and the rights of  the people, was 
intended to include them . . . .27
While this case holds great meaning for many 
reasons beyond the scope of  this paper, it is also 
significant because the Court expressly characterized 
citizenship in terms of  racial belonging. Thus, the 
Court focused on Scott’s racial difference as a reason 
why he did not belong to the nation in the form of  
a citizen. Although this decision was later overturned 
by the Fourteenth Amendment,28 its characterization 
of  noncitizens as racially different “others” set the 
jurisprudential stage for the Chinese Exclusions Act 
case.
Chinese Exclusion and the Plenary Power Doctrine
Chae Chan Ping set forth the plenary power 
doctrine, allowing the political branches unfettered 
power to regulate immigration. This discretionary 
and far reaching power was justified in the name of  
“protecting” the nation from the danger posed by 
racially different foreign nationals. The holdings of  
this case and the reasoning of  the Court have set the 
framework of  immigration law enforcement until 
present day. The Court’s reasoning focused on the 
Chinese’s racial difference as the reason why they 
failed to assimilate and the threat they posed by that 
failure.29
On May 8, 1882, Congress passed the 
Chinese Exclusion Act, which allowed the Executive 
branch to exclude Chinese nationals from entering 
the United States.30 Under the Act, Chinese nationals 
already living in the United States needed to obtain 
a certificate of  reentry if  they 
left the country and wanted 
to return.31 Chae Chan Ping 
was a Chinese-born laborer 
living in California during the 
California Gold Rush, which 
lasted from approximately 
1848 to 1855.32 Before leaving 
the country to visit China, Ping obtained a certificate 
of  reentry, as required by the Act.33 However, during 
his absence from the country, Congress amended 
the Act to ban reentry of  Chinese, including those 
who had obtained a certificate to do so.34 Ping was 
barred from entering the country and challenged his 
exclusion, which the Court upheld.35
 Justice Field, writing for a unanimous court, 
pointed to the Chinese laborers’ race as the underlying 
reason why they could not assimilate to U.S. culture:
The differences of  race added 
greatly to the difficulties of  the situ-
ation. . . . [T]hey remained strangers 
in the land, residing apart by them-
selves, and adhering to the customs 
and usages of  their own country. 
It seemed impossible for them to 
assimilate with our people, or to 
make any change in their habits or 
modes of  living.36
The analysis then seamlessly transitioned 
into the danger that the Chinese posed due to the 
increase in their population:
As they grew in numbers each year 
the people of  the coast saw, or 
believed they saw, in the facility of  
immigration, and in the crowded 
millions of  China, where population 
presses upon the means of  subsis-
tence, great danger that at no dis-
tant day that portion of  our country 
would be overrun by them, unless 
prompt action was taken to restrict 
their immigration. The people there 
whether the original framers intended 
to include slaves within the meaning 
of  the Constitution
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accordingly petitioned earnestly for 
protective legislation.37
It is clear that the Court based the racial 
difference of  the Chinese on their inability to 
assimilate, which posed a 
“threat” to the people of  the 
United States. Justice Field 
paints a picture of  “others” 
overtaking the nation.38 In the 
eyes of  the Court, as well as 
those of  Congress, the increased 
presence of  the Chinese—a 
group viewed as so racially 
different that they could not blend in with their 
surrounding population—was something from which 
the people of  the United States needed protection. 
It is through this framework of  non-belonging and 
danger that the Court not only justifies, but promotes 
the exclusion of  the Chinese. This logic is further 
evidenced when the Court declares:
If…the government of  the United 
States, through its legislative depart-
ment, considers the presence of  for-
eigners of  a different race in this coun-
try, who will not assimilate with us, to 
be dangerous to its peace and security, 
their exclusion is not to be stayed 
because at the time there are no 
actual hostilities with the nation of  
which the foreigners are subjects.39
Chae Chan Ping built on the notion in Dred 
Scott of  racial difference as creating a barrier to 
assimilation. The Court in both cases views an 
inability to assimilate due to racial difference as the 
ultimate marker of  non-belonging. Going a step 
further, the Court in Chae Chan Ping characterizes 
the racial difference of  noncitizens as a threat to 
the nation, which justifies the political branches in 
taking whatever measures they deem appropriate in 
regulating immigration.40 The result of  this rationale 
is the plenary power doctrine, which ultimately leads 
to constitutional rights-stripping of  noncitizens.
The Naturalization Process: Determining Whiteness
The “naturalization cases” refer to the 
set of  cases in which immigrants argued that they 
should be allowed to naturalize under the provisions 
of  the Naturalization Act of  1790 that extended 
citizenship to “free white persons” and, after the 
Fourteenth Amendment, “aliens of  African nativity 
and . . . persons of  African descent.”41 In these cases 
courts determined whether a 
particular group could meet the 
prerequisite of  being white in 
order to naturalize. The cases 
focused on race as an indicator 
of  whether immigrants could 
assimilate into U.S. culture, 
which was another way of  
determining if  they belonged 
and were thus worthy of  
citizenship status. The race-based requirement to 
naturalize was not lifted until 1952 with the passage 
of  the McCarran-Walter Act.42
It is worth noting that as a reaction to Dred 
Scott and Reconstruction efforts to rectify gross 
inequalities, the Naturalization Act of  1790 was 
amended to include “aliens of  African nativity and 
persons of  African descent.”43 As a result of  this 
amendment, a black-white dichotomy of  races within 
the naturalization system was created. The fact that all 
naturalization cases consisted of  courts determining 
whether a particular group could be considered white 
indicates that the black-white dichotomy was in fact 
a racial hierarchy in which whites were the dominate 
group to which noncitizens must conform. As such, 
white was further constructed as the superior race to 
which immigrants should assimilate if  they were to 
enjoy the full benefits of  U.S. citizenship.
For instance, In re Halladjian, Judge Lowell in 
the Massachusetts Circuit Court granted citizenship to 
four Armenians by relying on the popular usage of  the 
term “free white person.”44 The judge turned to late 
eighteenth-century census documents that described 
the inhabitants of  the former colonies.45 Judge Lowell 
reasoned that since the censuses expressly mentioned 
“Indians, Chinese, and Japanese,” the term white 
was used as a “catch-all word to include everybody 
else.”46 While recognizing that “there is no European 
or white race,” Judge Lowell nonetheless allowed the 
notion of  whiteness to continue as a prerequisite to 
naturalizing. He granted the Armenians citizenship 
based on the fact they could conceivably fall under 
the catch all description of  whiteness since their race 
was not explicitly mentioned in the censuses.47
The Court’s reasoning focused  
on the Chinese’s racial difference 
as the reason why they failed to 
assimilate and the threat they  
posed by that failure.
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However, in Ozawa the Supreme Court 
denied a Japanese man citizenship because he was 
deemed as falling outside the Caucasian race and thus 
could not be granted citizenship.48 The Court rejected 
a color test to define whiteness and instead relied 
on the meaning of  Caucasian as “a zone of  more or 
less debatable ground outside of  which, upon the one 
hand, are those clearly eligible, and outside of  which, 
upon the other hand, are those clearly ineligible for 
citizenship.”49 Like the Massachusetts Court, the 
Supreme Court raised doubt about the concreteness 
of  the meaning of  the term “white” or “Caucasian” 
but nonetheless chose to advance the notion of  
whiteness as a requisite of  citizenship.50
In United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind,51 an 
Indian national contested the denial of  his citizenship 
application. The Supreme Court held that “upper 
class Hindus” could not be classified as white and 
were therefore barred from naturalizing.52 The Court 
conceded that trying to define whiteness through 
biology or reference to Caucasian ancestry was 
elusive and not scientifically sound.53 However, the 
Court nonetheless connected whiteness with the 
ability to assimilate by rationalizing that Europeans 
were white because they could “merge into the mass 
of  our population and lose the distinctive hallmarks 
of  their European origin.”54 Within this definition of  
white, assimilation did not mean merely adjusting to 
“American culture” but instead losing one’s identity 
to blend in with the white majority.55 Hindus were 
denied white status precisely because they “would 
retain indefinitely the clear evidence of  their 
ancestry.”56
Mexican Repatriation and Operation Wetback:  
History Repeats Itself
During the Great Depression, President 
Hoover authorized the removal of  Mexican nationals, 
although more than half  of  those removed turned out 
to be U.S. Citizens.57 Due to the economic downturn, 
the repatriation was intended to ensure that only 
“true Americans” held jobs in the United States.58 To 
assist in the round-up, all over the nation police raided 
public spaces, including churches, and forced people 
of  Mexican ancestry onto trains and buses headed for 
the U.S.-Mexico border.59 By the end of  the decade-
long deportation campaign, deemed “repatriation,” 
an estimated one million people of  Mexican ancestry 
were removed from the country.60
History repeated itself  in 1954—just two 
years after race requirements were removed from the 
naturalization system. Congress passed Operation 
Wetback, intended to deport Mexican “wetbacks,” a 
term legitimately used in mainstream discourse to refer 
to illegal Mexican immigrants.61 Operation Wetback 
went hand-in-hand with the Bracero Program set up 
by the United States to import temporary Mexican 
agricultural workers in order to address labor shortages 
due to World War II.62 While the United States 
welcomed the labor of  Mexican nationals through 
the Bracero program, it simultaneously rejected the 
presence of  Mexican nationals beyond their capacity 
as laborers. Hence, Operation Wetback was intended 
to address the increase in illegal immigration that had 
grown alongside the Bracero Program.63
Under the program, undocumented 
Mexican nationals and Mexican nationals who were 
legally present under the Bracero Program were 
indistinguishable.64 Therefore, Operation Wetback’s 
main mission of  deporting “illegal” Mexican 
immigrants served more as a cover to remove all 
Mexican nationals deemed a threat to society. As 
evidenced by the title of  the deportation campaign, 
once again racial difference fueled the exclusion 
of  immigrants who were deemed harmful to 
society. Under Operation Wetback, more than one 
million people were deported. 65 Like the Mexican 
Repatriation, many deportees were U.S. citizens.66
Section	Two:	Extra-constitutionality	of	
Immigration	Law
The evolution of  immigration law since 
Chae Chan Ping illustrates that, as a result of  the 
plenary power doctrine, fundamental constitutional 
protections are applied in a highly restrictive manner 
in the immigration context. Challenging government 
action that regulates immigration is very difficult 
since the plenary power doctrine also ensures that 
courts provide deference to the political branches 
regarding immigration laws.67 Without a check on 
this unfettered discretion, the political branches are 
able to abuse their power, as evidenced in federal 
immigration laws that strip constitutional rights from 
noncitizens and promote racial profiling.
SPRING 2011 47
Noncitizens are described as not being 
punished by deportation but merely regulated.68 
Therefore, immigration proceedings are characterized 
as civil rather than criminal.69 As a consequence, 
many of  the constitutional protections afforded to 
criminal defendants are stripped from noncitizens 
undergoing deportation proceedings. For instance, 
noncitizens who undergo immigration proceedings 
are not afforded many basic constitutional rights 
under Article I of  the Constitution, the Fourth 
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Sixth 
Amendment. Specifically, immigration regulations 
can be applied retroactively, in violation of  the Ex 
Post Facto Clause of  Article I, section 9 of  the 
United States Constitution.70 In addition, the Fourth 
Amendment remedy for suppression of  evidence 
obtained in an illegal search or seizure is applied in 
a very limited fashion to noncitizens.71 Noncitizens 
do not enjoy a presumption of  innocence72 and they 
receive no Fifth Amendment protection regarding 
the right to remain silent; silence can be used against 
them.73 Noncitizens are also not afforded the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees to an impartial jury, a speedy 
trial, and right to counsel.74 Furthermore, the rules of  
evidence do not apply to immigration proceedings75 
and the government may use secret evidence against 
noncitizens.76 The constitutional rights stripping of  
noncitizens made possible by the plenary power 
doctrine, makes immigration law immune from many 
standard constitutional protections. As a result, police 
action that would otherwise be unconstitutional is 
considered legal when executed in the immigration 
context. A prime example is the widespread use of  
racial profiling to regulate immigration.
Section	Three:	Using	Race	to	Identify	
Noncitizens
Current Supreme Court precedent allows 
for the use of  racial profiling in immigration 
enforcement.77 Amnesty International defines racial 
profiling as:
[T]he targeting of  individuals and 
groups by law enforcement officials, 
even partially, on the basis of  race, 
ethnicity, national origin, or religion, 
except where there is trustworthy 
information, relevant to the locality 
and timeframe, that links persons 
belonging to one of  the aforemen-
tioned groups to an identified crimi-
nal incident or scheme.78
Based on this definition, the legal use of  
racial profiling within the immigration context 
suggests that race becomes “trustworthy information” 
regarding a person’s likelihood of  being unlawfully 
present in the country. Current immigration case law 
demonstrates this correlation.
Under Brignoni-Ponce, the Court established 
the legal use of  racial profiling as a tool to enforce 
immigration law.79 Specifically, “Mexican-appearance” 
in conjunction with other articulable facts was 
described as creating the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to stop someone under the Fourth 
Amendment. In Brignoni-Ponce, the Border Patrol had 
set up a checkpoint in San Clemente, California.80 
One evening, while the checkpoint was closed due 
to bad weather, Border Patrol officers observed 
traffic from their vehicle parked on the side of  the 
highway.81 They stopped respondent’s car, stating 
that the respondent’s Mexican-looking appearance 
was their only basis for doing so.82 Although the 
Court found that Mexican appearance alone is not a 
sufficient reason for stopping a person, it can be used 
in conjunction with other factors.83
Brignoni-Ponce is a pivotal case because it 
validated the use of  racial stereotypes to define 
“Mexican appearance” and connected race with the 
likelihood of  illegal conduct. The Court took the 
government at its word that trained officers can detect 
“the characteristic appearance” of  people who live in 
Mexico based on “such factors as the mode of  dress 
and haircut.”84 In no way did the Court challenge this 
allegation. In fact, “mode of  dress and haircut” are 
merely examples of  what immigration officers use to 
detect someone from Mexico. Immigration officials 
may be explicitly using race and accents as factors, 
but the Court makes no inquiry into this. By not 
challenging the government’s assertion, the Court 
effectively allowed the government to decide what it 
means to “look Mexican.”
The Court goes a step further by correlating 
“Mexican appearance” with the likelihood of  being 
unlawfully present in the United States. In the 
Court’s words, “[t]he likelihood that any given person 
of  Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to 
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make Mexican appearance a relevant factor.”85 The 
Court concluded its opinion by stating the Fourth 
Amendment requires that when a person is stopped 
there must be at least “reasonable suspicion” that 
the person is an “alien.”86 In reaching its holding, the 
Court allowed the notion of  “Mexican appearance” 
based on racial stereotypes to create suspicion of  
illegal activity. Brignoni-Ponce remains the law and 
therefore, in the context of  immigration regulation, 
“looking Mexican” carries a presumption of  illegality.
The correlation between race and illegal 
conduct has been extended to target other ethnic 
groups in the context of  the War on Terror. In 
Farag, the Government cited Brignoni-Ponce to 
allow air transportation officials to consider “Arab 
appearance” as a relevant factor when stopping air 
passengers because all of  the 9-11 hijackers were 
“Middle Eastern males.”87 Even though the Court 
rejected the Government’s argument, it did reaffirm 
and distinguish the use of  race in Brignoni-Ponce 
since that case was formally within the context of  
immigration enforcement.88
Even though in Farag the Court rejected 
“Arab appearance” as a relevant factor when stopping 
air passengers, the government need only turn to 
its official national security policy to consider race. 
Federal national security policy recognizes that racial 
profiling, in certain contexts, is considered legal:
In investigating or preventing 
threats to national security or other 
catastrophic events (including the 
performance of  duties related to 
air transportation security), or in 
enforcing laws protecting the integ-
rity of  the Nation’s borders, Federal 
law enforcement officers may not 
consider race or ethnicity except to the 
extent permitted by the Constitution and 
laws of  the United States.89
Based on the precedent set forth in Brignoni-
Ponce, it is likely that the government may target 
different ethnicities in its national security efforts until 
a case comes before the court forbidding specific uses 
of  ethnic appearance, such as “Arab appearance.” 
With the increase of  local officials obtaining the ability 
to conduct immigration enforcement, 90 after Brignoni-
Ponce, racial profiling will continue to be widely used 
under the guise of  immigration enforcement.
Using racial profiling as a valid immigration 
enforcement tool allows racial stereotypes to gain 
more social currency, both within and outside of  
the immigration context. When immigration law 
allows race to indicate a valid suspicion of  illegal 
presence, race becomes a factor that generally indicates 
illegal activity. Furthermore, racial profiling of  
noncitizens inevitably affects citizens of  the same 
race. This means that U.S. citizens who happen to 
the same race as targeted noncitizens will be subject 
to the same racialized standards of  reasonable 
suspicion. Countless examples of  this reality include 
the deportation of  U.S. citizens based on “looking 
illegal.”91 Additionally, racial profiling techniques 
used by local law enforcement officials under 287(g) 
are likely to bleed over into standard law enforcement 
efforts.
Section	Four:	SB	1070
SB 1070 explicitly states that the policy 
behind the law is “attrition through enforcement,”92 
or exclusion of  “unlawful aliens” by making their 
lives so difficult that they voluntarily choose to leave 
the country rather than being subject to deportation.93 
As the law’s author, Arizona Senator Russell Pearce, 
states “Arizona has made it clear through our policies 
that illegal immigrants are not welcome, and they are 
self-deporting from the state.”94 SB 1070 creates new 
immigration crimes and mandates that law enforcement 
officials determine the immigration status of  a 
person when “reasonable suspicion” exists that she 
is “an alien who is unlawfully present in the United 
States.”95 In fact, the law allows Arizona citizens to 
sue officials or agencies they believe are not enforcing 
immigration law to the full extent permissible under 
federal law.96
In many ways SB 1070 is the modern 
incarnation of  Chae Chan Ping because it explicitly 
attempts to exclude an immigrant community based 
on the alleged threat that that community poses to 
U.S. citizens. In the process of  excluding, SB 1070, 
like Chae Chan Ping, reifies notions of  racial inferiority 
by using race as an indicator of  non-belonging. In 
Chae Chan Ping, race was a barrier to assimilation 
and thus justified excluding the Chinese. Under SB 
1070, racial profiling is used to identify potential 
“illegal immigrants” who “are not welcome” in 
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Arizona. As a result, many critics have referred to 
SB 1070 as the “breathing while brown” law.97 The 
mandated determination of  immigration status 
based on “reasonable suspicion” is akin to mandated 
racial profiling of  mainly Hispanic immigrants. This 
reality is confirmed by Arizona’s failure to articulate 
on what grounds other than race law enforcement 
officials will base their reasonable suspicion that a 
person is unlawfully present. Arizona Congressmen 
have fumbled as they describe factors other than 
race that create reasonable suspicion of  unlawful 
presence: attire, accents, grooming, and shoes.98 It 
appears that SB 1070 attempts to codify Brignoni-Ponce 
and mandate that “Mexican appearance” be used in 
enforcing immigration—despite politicians claiming 
that race will not serve as a factor.
However disturbing the law’s explicit focus 
on race, what is more problematic is that the current 
legal battle over the law is focused on notions of  
preemption: whether Arizona’s law conflicts with 
federal immigration enforcement. While other legal 
arguments regarding equal protection have been 
advanced to overturn SB 1070,99 preemption remains 
the strongest threat to the law. This suggests that the 
true legal battle is over who gets to do the excluding 
and racial profiling: the federal government or the 
states? Recognizing that federal immigration law is 
nearly if  not equally as troubling as SB 1070, I focus 
on the Arizona law given its explicit representation of  
Johnson’s notion of  transference and Ngai’s theory of  
alien citizenship. In light of  this, the popular support 
SB 1070 has received across the nation suggests that 
immigration law continues to be a powerful vehicle 
of  racial subordination.
Criminalizing Immigrants as Transference
SB 1070 creates new immigration crimes, 
further criminalizing the immigrant community. 
Kevin Johnson advances the theory of  transference, 
which occurs when society transfers its racism 
towards minority citizens to noncitizens.100 As 
Johnson explains, “immigration status, combined 
with race, ma[kes] such treatment more socially 
acceptable and legally defensible.”101 Johnson traces 
transference, as it applies in the immigration context, 
to the psychological theory that feelings toward one 
group of  people are refocused on another.102 As a 
result of  transference, Johnson believes that a society’s 
treatment of  noncitizens of  color reveals its feelings 
toward citizens of  color.103 Thus, Johnson describes 
differential treatment of  citizens and noncitizens as a 
“magic mirror” that reveals “how dominant society 
might treat domestic minorities if  legal constraints 
were abrogated.”104 Not only does Johnson’s theory 
help explain why immigration law has historically 
treated noncitizens as racially inferior, it also explains 
how immigration law implicates all citizens of  color 
regardless of  citizenship—even though citizenship 
continues to serve as a tool to exclude noncitizens 
on the basis of  race. SB 1070 is, therefore, a grave 
warning sign for all citizens of  color in Arizona.
Unlike federal law, SB 1070 makes it a state 
crime for an “unauthorized alien” to apply for a job 
or to solicit work publically.105 The latter crime would 
affect mainly Mexican day laborers who congregate 
in certain areas of  town where people come to 
solicit work.106 A related crime includes knowingly 
transporting a person who is unlawfully present 
in the country.107 Many of  these new crimes come 
with mandatory jail times.108 Additionally, SB 1070 
makes not carrying immigration papers a crime.109 In 
order to enforce these new criminal laws, SB 1070 
allows law enforcement officials to ask for proof  of  
citizenship during a “legal stop, detention, or arrest,” 
which can include questioning people who are victims 
of  crimes themselves or stopped for offenses like 
traffic violations or loitering.110 If  a lawfully present 
noncitizen111 is stopped and does not have proper 
immigration papers, he or she will be subject to arrest 
and a fee of  $500 for a first time violation.112 The 
penalties associated with not carrying one’s papers 
makes life difficult for all noncitizens, suggesting that 
all immigrants in Arizona are unwelcome—not just 
those who are undocumented.
In 2006, Hispanics accounted for 29.1% 
of  Arizona’s total population.113 This figure is 
approximately twice as high as the Hispanic population 
in the rest of  the United States, which was 14.8% the 
same year.114 The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that 
in 2006, 6.9% to 7.7% of  the State’s total population 
was undocumented.115 These figures suggest that the 
percentage of  undocumented people in Arizona as of  
2006 was not overwhelmingly large. However, these 
figures also suggest that the increase in Hispanics in 
Arizona was substantial. Applying Johnson’s theory 
of  transference, it appears that Arizona’s perception 
of  being “invaded” by “illegals”116 indicates an 
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underlying fear of  a general increase in the Hispanic 
population as a whole. In fact, the Pew Hispanic 
Center found that while the native- and foreign-born 
Hispanic population grew substantially from 2000 
to 2006, so did the non-Hispanic population.117 On 
a percentage basis, “Hispanics have contributed no 
more to population growth in Arizona than they have 
to the growth of  the U.S. population.”118
If  the Hispanic population grew at a similar 
rate as the non-Hispanic population, Johnson’s 
transference theory indicates that Arizona’s fear of  
“illegal immigration” is based on the fear of  a general 
increase of  the Hispanic population, despite the fact 
that in 2006, the figure of  undocumented people was 
at most 7.7%. In other words, Arizona’s “crackdown” 
on the “invasion” of  Hispanic “illegals” is not only 
inaccurate, but indicates that fear of  an increase in 
the Hispanic population has translated into a fear of  
an increase in noncitizens. As Johnson points out, it 
is much more socially acceptable to target noncitizens 
of  color than it is to target citizens of  color.119 As 
a result, Arizona’s “crackdown” maintains popular 
support in the state because society has equated 
Hispanics with illegal immigration.
Due to an increase in the Hispanic population, 
even though this increase did not outmatch the 
growth of  the non-Hispanic population, Arizona 
has transferred its general fear of  Hispanics to 
noncitizens by over criminalizing immigrants. Samuel 
Huntington’s disapproval of  Hispanic immigration is 
mirrored in SB 1070. This fear and racial animosity 
results in the nation’s toughest immigration law.
Reasonable Suspicion as Mandated Racial Profiling: 
Recreating the Mexican “Illegal Alien”
Particularly troubling is SB 1070’s mandate to 
determine immigration status based on “reasonable 
suspicion” that a person is unlawfully present in the 
United States.120 This mandate leads to increased 
racial profiling. As federal law demonstrates, using 
Mexican appearance as a factor in determining 
immigration status is lawful.121 However, federal law 
indicates that using race may be permitted, whereas 
SB 1070’s requirement that immigration law must be 
enforced “to the full extent that federal law permits” 
suggests that race must be used as a factor. SB 1070 
states that race must not be the “sole” factor in 
determining immigration status, suggesting that it is 
indeed a central factor.122
This increased racial profiling highlights 
what Mae M. Ngai describes as alien citizenship. Ngai 
describes the alien citizen as “an American citizen by 
virtue of  her birth in the United States but whose 
citizenship is suspect, if  not denied on account of  
the racialized identity of  her immigrant ancestry.”123 
Ngai argues that non-white groups are deemed 
immutable, “making [their] nationality a kind of  
racial trait.”124 As a result, non-white groups obtain a 
permanent foreignness that leads to a nullification of  
U.S. citizenship.125 SB 1070’s mandated racial profiling 
creates a similar type of  permanent foreignness as 
Hispanics, regardless of  citizenship status, become 
susceptible to being stopped and asked to prove their 
legal status by producing their papers. No limit exists 
on the amount of  times a person may be stopped, 
leading to the possibility that one must constantly 
prove his belonging. As a result, Hispanics carry a 
strong presumption of  foreignness under SB 1070. 
As Ngai states, “[r]acism thus creates a problem of  
misrecognition for the citizen of  . . . Latino descent 
. . . .”126
To be clear, Ngai believes that alien 
citizenship is a form of  rights nullification that has 
existed throughout history, specifically exemplified 
by the territorial removal of  one million Mexicans 
during the Great Depression (more than half  of  
whom were U.S. Citizens) and the internment of  
120,000 Japanese Americans during World War II 
(two-thirds of  whom were U.S. Citizens).127 Ngai 
traces the creation of  Mexican “illegal alien” to the 
Jim Crow segregation of  Mexicans in the southwest 
who were stripped of  belonging.128 I argue that SB 
1070 serves as the rebirth of  the Mexican “illegal 
alien.”
Public Reaction to SB 1070
If  immigration law is a “helpful gauge for 
measuring this nation’s racial sensibilities”129 as Kevin 
Johnson suggests, what does the nation’s reaction to 
SB 1070 indicate? A survey conducted on October 
31, 2010 revealed that fifty percent of  Arizona voters 
believe that SB 1070 has positively affected the state’s 
image (this figure is up from forty-one percent in May 
of  2010).130 The same survey also revealed that sixty-
one percent of  the state’s voters still favor the new 
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immigration law.131 In fact, Governor Jan Brewer, 
who signed SB 1070 into law, easily won reelection in 
the 2010 mid-term elections.132
On a national level, civil rights groups have 
certainly voiced strong disapproval of  SB 1070.133 
Litigation intended to overturn the law has also been 
somewhat successful.134 However, since SB 1070 
was signed into law on April 23, 2010, twenty-two 
states have introduced legislation modeled on the 
new law.135 These “copycat” laws suggest support 
for SB 1070 by much of  the country. In fact, during 
the 2010 mid-term elections, SB 1070 served as a 
major platform issue to gain political support. As 
Politico reported, in order to win votes, Republican 
candidates had to explicitly state their support for the 
law.136 Furthermore, the day after the injunction on 
the law, “59 percent of  American voters wanted an 
Arizona-style law in their state, while only 32 percent 
did not.”137 States with high Hispanic populations 
show support for an Arizona-style law above the 
national average. For instance, sixty-two percent of  
Texas voters favor a law similar to Arizona’s and sixty 
percent of  Colorado voters agree.138
The plenary power doctrine set forth in Chae 
Chan Ping has led to federal immigration law that strips 
noncitizens of  crucial constitutional protections. 
This reality has set the stage for state laws like SB 
1070 that represent states’ frustration with federal 
enforcement. Johnson’s notion of  transference 
is evidenced when states like Arizona with large 
Hispanic populations develop animosity towards their 
immigrant populations and show frustration over the 
federal government not taking full advantage of  the 
plenary power it has over immigration enforcement. 
While SB 1070 represents the modern incarnation of  
Chae Chan Ping, the history of  U.S. immigration law 
suggests that Arizona’s attempts at exclusion based 
on racial difference should come as no surprise. 
The type of  alien citizenship that exists for many in 
Arizona is likely to spread as national support for SB 
1070 remains strong and states continue to introduce 
copycat laws.
Section	Five:	Recommendations
I recognize that the thesis driving 
the arguments in my paper is unpleasant: U.S. 
immigration law uses racial difference as an indicator 
of  non-belonging and thus reifies notions of  racial 
inferiority. However, this truth is undeniable in light 
of  the evolution of  immigration law from Chae 
Chan Ping to SB 1070. Historically, immigration 
regulation in the United States has explicitly relied 
on race and notions of  racial inferiority to deny 
people citizenship status. Under current immigration 
law, Supreme Court precedent allows for “Mexican 
appearance” to serve as a factor in determining a 
person’s immigration status. Most recently, national 
support for SB 1070, a law that in practice mandates 
racial profiling, represents the nation’s support for 
excluding racially different noncitizens. In the United 
States, it is far too easy to exercise racism under the 
guise of  immigration enforcement.
This grim reality can only be altered by 
public education efforts that bring to light this 
nation’s historic and contemporary racist treatment 
of  immigrants. Additionally, civil rights and 
immigrants’ rights organizations must argue that 
racial discrimination in the immigration context 
deserves strict scrutiny—the plenary power doctrine 
should not trump the Supreme Court’s practice of  
applying strict scrutiny whenever fundamental rights 
are implicated.
Public Education
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s inspiring words are 
used by immigrants’ rights advocates across the nation, 
“Remember, remember always that all of  us, and you 
and I especially, are descended from immigrants and 
revolutionists.”139 However, racist immigration laws 
and policies throughout our nation’s history reveal 
that society has not been quick to remember that all 
U.S. citizens are “descended from immigrants.” If  
people have reflected on their immigrant past, then 
they are quick to forget since it is difficult to detect 
empathy and tolerance in our nation’s immigration 
laws. In fact, the Senate recently blocked the DREAM 
Act, a bill intended to put undocumented immigrant 
students on a path to citizenship.140
I am someone who has dedicated the past 
seven years to learning about immigration to the 
United States, as well as global migration patterns. 
Only until I entered law school did I learn of  
the problematic use of  race within this nations’ 
immigration jurisprudence. It appears that our 
nation’s racist treatment of  immigrants is a secret 
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history to which most U.S. citizens have not been 
exposed. In fact, one of  the most famous symbols of  
our country is the melting pot, which many people 
believe represents the idea that all people, regardless 
of  race, religion, or culture, achieve harmony within 
the United States. However, the “melting pot,” is a 
metaphor that describes the process of  assimilation 
in order to achieve homogeneity in society.141 The play 
by Israel Zangwill, The Melting Pot,142 popularized the 
term. As our nation’s naturalization laws until 1952 
show, that “melting pot” never included people of  
color since being American also meant being white.
Education textbooks must include more 
information about moments like the Mexican 
Repatriation, Operation Wetback, and other shameful 
moments in immigration history. A 2006 survey of  
nine American history textbooks found that only 
one dedicated more than half  a page to the Mexican 
Repatriation.143 In fact, as future generations learn 
of  the 9-11 terrorist attacks through textbooks, they 
should also learn about the rise in hate crimes against 
Muslim Americans and the deportation of  315,000 
“alien absconders” selectively applied to Muslims, 
Arabs and South Asians shortly after 9-11.144 However, 
before parents can promote exposing their children 
to immigration history in the United States, they 
too must learn of  this secret past. Only by exposing 
the general public to this nation’s historic treatment 
of  immigrants will people begin to see through the 
illusion of  race-neutral immigration laws.
Breaking Myths and Humanizing the Immigrant 
Experience
In order to dismantle fear campaigns created 
around the alleged threats that immigrants pose, 
additional public education campaigns are needed to 
break the myths that permeate the public’s perception 
of  immigration.145 While doing so, these campaigns 
should humanize the immigrant experience by 
revealing statistics regarding mixed status families.
For instance, MALDEF’s Truth in Immigration 
campaign should serve as a model campaign for other 
organizations. Through this campaign, MALDEF 
rebuts statistical and legal inaccuracies regarding 
immigration.146 For instance, many people criticize 
undocumented immigrants as making a choice to 
enter the country illegally in violation of  this nation’s 
laws. However, MALDEF counters that notion by 
pointing out that more than 2 million immigrants 
come to this country as minor children.147 On a 
related note, mixed status families exist throughout 
the United States, making it difficult to draw lines 
based on citizenship that dictate who belongs and 
who does not.148 These realities must become public 
knowledge in order to combat fear campaigns that 
dehumanize immigrants.
Litigation
Under current constitutional law, every time 
a fundamental right is implicated, a law must pass 
strict scrutiny.149 This standard requires that a law 
be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling interest.150 
However, all immigration statutes, due to the 
plenary power afforded the federal government in 
regulating immigration, receive judicial deference.151 
Furthermore, the standard set forth in Fiallo states 
that even when fundamental rights that normally 
receive strict scrutiny, such as marriage, are at issue 
in the immigration context, deferential treatment 
still applies.152 However, Justice Marshall’s dissent, 
joined by Justice Brennan, should give civil rights 
attorneys a stepping stone to make legal arguments 
that immigration statutes should not always receive 
deferential treatment. Justice Marshall states:
[T]he Court appears to hold that 
discrimination among citizens, how-
ever invidious and irrational, must 
be tolerated if  it occurs in the con-
text of  the immigration laws. Since 
I cannot agree that Congress has 
license to deny fundamental rights 
to citizens according to the most 
disfavored criteria simply because 
the Immigration and Nationality 
Act is involved, I dissent.153
While Justice Marshall limits his criticism 
to discrimination in the immigration context that 
affects citizens, his dissent does promote the idea 
that immigration statutes should not always receive 
deferential treatment when fundamental rights are 
implicated. Cases brought by U.S. citizens who have 
been wrongfully deported could advance Justice 
Marshall’s stance. This argument can eventually be 
expanded to noncitizens by civil rights attorneys 
advocating the position that when fundamental 
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rights, such as being free from racial discrimination, 
are implicated, the Supreme Court should never 
apply deferential review, regardless of  the plaintiff ’s 
citizenship status.
A particularly compelling argument to 
incorporate is that the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not restrict equal protection and due process to 
citizens since “[n]o State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of  citizens of  the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of  life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of  law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of  the laws.”154 The 
notion that people present in the United States are 
entitled to equal protection regardless of  citizenship 
status was supported in Plyer v. Doe.155 New legal 
arguments that attempt to extend the Court’s rationale 
in Plyer v. Doe must be advanced.
While the government may argue that national 
security is a compelling interest that allows for its 
unfettered discretion in regulating immigration, civil 
rights groups should argue that the Supreme Court 
must take a more nuanced approach to immigration 
and not treat it solely within the context of  the War 
on Terror. Additionally, civil rights groups must also 
argue that using racial profiling is not a narrowly 
tailored means of  achieving compelling interests 
related to national security.
Achieving more than deferential review of  
immigration statutes that discriminate, or lead to 
discrimination, is surely an uphill battle, but these 
legal arguments must be made. Perhaps justices will 
continue to dissent and provide even more fodder to 
civil rights attorneys making new legal arguments for 
stricter review of  immigration statutes.
Conclusion
SB 1070 exemplifies immigration laws’ 
reliance on race as an indicator of  non-belonging. 
In the process, notions of  racial inferiority abound 
as Hispanics become indistinguishable from 
“unwelcome illegal immigrants.” SB 1070’s mandate 
to identify noncitizens who do not belong is executed 
through racial profiling. Johnson would likely agree 
that Arizonans who support the law and recently 
reelected the governor who signed SB 1070 into 
law have transferred their racial animosity towards 
Hispanics to noncitizens. Ngai would likely agree 
that the consequences of  this transference results 
in a state of  alien citizenship for Hispanics whose 
citizenship has been made suspect by the law.
SB 1070 results from a long history of  racist 
immigration law and policy in the United States. In 
particular, the plenary power doctrine developed in 
Chae Chan Ping has facilitated the creation of  laws 
like SB 1070 that claim to merely mirror federal 
immigration law, which deprives noncitizens of  
vital constitutional protections. The central debate 
surrounding SB 1070 has become, who gets to do the 
excluding of  noncitizens: the states or the federal 
government?
The only way racism can become divorced 
from immigration law is to expose the general public 
to this nation’s history of  racism towards immigrants. 
Humanizing the immigrant experience is also 
important in order to question the idea that citizenship 
is the ultimate marker of  belonging. Furthermore, 
society must look into Johnson’s “magic mirror” 
and realize that its treatment of  immigrants of  color 
reflects how it views citizens of  color. On the legal 
front, civil rights and immigrants’ rights organizations 
must continue to fight the hard battle of  gaining 
more than deferential review of  immigration statutes. 
Only when these goals are accomplished will laws like 
SB 1070 lose public support.
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A	REVIEW	OF	BROCK	THOMPSON’S	
THE UN–NATURAL STATE: 
ARKANSAS AND THE QUEER SOUTH
By Katy Bosse1
Brock Thompson begins his historical and 
anthropological account of  the Southern gay and 
lesbian movement by outing his great–aunt Opal. 
Thompson examines the secretive life she led, living 
with her suspected partner Jerry, placing the story of  
growing up gay in the South in a personal context that 
frames the rest of  his discussion.2 The Un–Natural 
State: Arkansas and the Queer South tells the stories of  
many gay and lesbian Arkansans from the 1930s to 
the present, and how their experiences are woven into 
the broader themes of  queer identity politics in the 
American South.
Thompson, who received his PhD at King’s 
College in London and currently works at the Library 
of  Congress, divides his book into three segments, 
each based on a different part of  Arkansas history. 
He uses the term “queer” to describe not only gay 
men and women, but also acts of  homosexuality 
and many other actions outside the social norm 
of  the period. The fi rst section of  the book, The 
Diamond State, focuses on the culture of  drag shows 
and its importance for gay community expression, 
beginning in the 1930s through modern times. 
The second section, The Natural State, focuses on 
Arkansas’s sodomy statute and its transformation 
from a generally antiquated and ignored law in the 
early seventies to one that existed solely to persecute 
homosexuals throughout the eighties and nineties. 
The fi nal chapter, The Land of  Opportunity, 
chronicles the attempts of  many gays and lesbians, 
especially in the 1960s through the 1980s to form their 
own communities out of  reach from an increasingly 
hostile society.
The unique character of  The Un–Natural 
State stems not only from Thompson’s personal 
experiences growing up as a gay man in Arkansas, but 
his deep appreciation for Southern culture and the 
unique qualities that make it both a haven and a hell 
for queer persons and activities. Thompson correctly 
analyzes the many reasons many gays and lesbians 
still fi ght to make a home for themselves deep in the 
rural South when he says “There are certain things 
about Southern culture – the closeness to the land, 
church on Sunday – that so many do not want to give 
up to be another face in the city.”3
While Thompson’s work focuses on the 
relationship between identity, community, and cultural 
visibility, the legal themes underlying his work show 
that the law has been a constant partner in the fi ght 
for establishing a gay Southern identity. This review 
provides a brief  analysis of  the legal issues in each 
section of  Thompson’s book and explains how these 
issues have both helped and hurt the Southern gay 
movement.
The	Diamond	State
Thompson begins his discussion of  the 
evolution of  cross-dressing with a 1944 “womanless 
wedding.” These all-male productions, where the 
prominent men of  the town would dress up to 
play all the characters of  a wedding, were usually 
conducted as church or upper class fundraisers. 
Thompson compares these productions to blackface 
and minstrel shows throughout the South: a forum 
for powerful white men to bend gender and racial 
boundaries, demonstrating their ability to do so 
while others, mainly women and blacks, could not. 
Thompson points to World War II as the beginning 
of  modern drag, where the same sex environment 
gave rise to “female impersonators” in an acceptable 
setting. He then traces the personal story of  Norman 
Jones, the owner of  the Miss Gay America Pageant, 
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to demonstrate the cross dressing transition from a 
rural fundraiser to a queer entertainment outlet.
The history of  laws regulating clothing 
choice, generally called “sumptuary laws”, goes 
beyond the South and stretches back centuries.4 Early 
colonial laws, modeling themselves after Elizabethan 
laws, prohibited members of  society who did not 
make a certain income from wearing certain clothing.5 
Thompson discusses how Southern American culture 
regulated race in many of  the same ways it regulated 
sex, as shown by South Carolina’s slave code, which 
mandated specific clothing for all slaves.6
By the middle of  the nineteenth century, 
many American states had begun to pass laws 
regulating clothing according to gender distinctions.7 
In Toledo, Ohio it was a crime for any “perverted 
person” to appear in the clothing of  the opposite 
sex.8 The act of  cross-dressing was made a crime in 
many cities around the country, including Houston, 
San Francisco, and Kansas City.9 While Arkansas 
never had a cross dressing law on the books, the city 
of  Little Rock passed several laws in 1868 banning 
“immoral plays” and “indecent behavior.”10 While 
not codified in Arkansas, it is clear that American 
culture, especially in the South, wanted to enact laws 
enforcing “appropriate” behavior.11
Some legal scholars argue that the regulation 
of  gender specific clothing still exists.12 In 1987, 
the Southern District Court of  Ohio found that 
female students’ equal protection rights were not 
violated when police escorted them from the prom 
for wearing tuxedos.13 Males in the military have 
been court–marshaled for wearing women’s clothing, 
and male lawyers kicked out of  courtrooms for 
not wearing a tie.14 However, in 2010, the Marion 
Arkansas school board ruled that a female student, 
who usually wore men’s clothing, could wear a tuxedo 
in her senior picture.15 Cross dressing challenges the 
presumed relationship between men and women and 
clearly shows the blatant societal construction of  the 
terms “male” and “female”16 as Thompson subtly 
brings out in his history of  drag queens in Arkansas.
The	Natural	State
The Natural State begins by comparing the 
1976 Arkansas sodomy statute to the Georgia law 
upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick.17 The Arkansas sodomy 
statute created a misdemeanor offense if:
A: A person commits sodomy if  
such a person performs any act 
of  sexual gratification involving:
1: The penetration, however 
slight, of  the anus or mouth 
of  an animal or a person by 
the penis of  a person of  
the same sex or an animal; 
or
2: The penetration, however 
slight, of  the vagina or anus 
of  an animal or a person 
by any body member of  a 
person of  the same sex or 
animal.18
The Arkansas statute criminalized only 
behavior between members of  the same sex, unlike 
the Georgia statute, which criminalized the behavior 
regardless of  the couples’ sexual orientation.19 In fact, 
Arkansas was one of  only two states that reinstated 
their sodomy laws in the 1970s after legislators 
realized that the adoption of  the Model Penal Code 
protected homosexual privacy.20 Thompson then 
discusses the repercussions that stem from branding 
homosexuals as criminals through the use of  state 
sodomy laws. Most importantly, he highlights how the 
laws helped to create discrimination and intolerance 
within American society.
Throughout Thompson’s analysis of  sodomy 
laws and their role in promoting discrimination, he 
draws attention to the similarities and differences 
of  the African American experience in the modern 
American South. He states “This politics of  skin – its 
color, its exposure, its usage – worked to specifically 
define the other, the queer, as the deviant outsider 
working to unseat the status quo in Arkansas.”21 
Thompson addresses the unfortunate increased 
persecution of  anything “queer,” with borrowed 
Southern laws previous used to keep African 
Americans out of  society evolving into keeping gays 
and lesbians out of  the “normal” social customs.
In 2002, one year before the U.S. Supreme 
Court overturned all sodomy laws in Lawrence v. 
Texas,22 Arkansas struck down its sodomy statute.23 
In Jegley v. Picado, the Arkansas Supreme Court found 
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that section 5-14-22 of  the Arkansas code, which 
imposed a sentence of  up to a year or a $1000 
fine for homosexual sex, infringes upon the right 
to privacy guaranteed to Arkansas citizens by the 
state constitution.24 The suit was brought by several 
Arkansas residents who all admitted they had violated 
the law in the past and intended to violate the law 
in the future.25 While none of  the plaintiffs had 
previously been prosecuted for violating the law, the 
court found that because the plaintiffs had admitted 
to violating the statute, they faced a daily dilemma 
giving them standing.26 The Arkansas Supreme Court 
conceded that there is no explicit right to privacy or a 
right to engage in homosexual sodomy in the United 
States Constitution, but the court explored whether 
such a right exists in the Arkansas state constitution.27 
By finding that the Arkansas constitution recognizes 
a right to privacy within the home, a right to not 
be deprived of  life, liberty or property without due 
process, and a clause prohibiting the interpreting of  
rights in such a way that would disparage other rights, 
the court found that there is a right to privacy in 
the Arkansas constitution.28 Furthermore, the court 
found that the Arkansas Rules of  Criminal Procedure 
comments also recognize a right to privacy, which 
affords an arrestee protection against invasions of  
privacy.29
The court also found that the law violated 
Arkansas’s equal rights amendment because the law 
makes a classification based on gender.30 In examining 
the constitutionality of  the sodomy law, the court 
turned to the Model Penal Code, which notes that 
such laws “sacrifice personal liberty, not because the 
actor’s conduct results in harm to another citizen but 
only because it is inconsistent with the majoritarian 
notion of  acceptable behavior.”31 Combining these 
ideas of  equal protection and a right to privacy, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court found section 5-14-122 
unconstitutional.32
One year later, the United States Supreme 
Court struck down a Texas statute criminalizing 
homosexual sodomy as unconstitutional in Lawrence v. 
Texas.33 The Texas statute stated “[a] person commits 
an offense if  he engages in deviate sexual intercourse 
with another individual of  the same sex,” which the 
code defined as “(a) any contact between any part of  
the genitals of  one person and the mouth or anus of  
another person; or (b) the penetration of  the genitals 
or the anus of  another person with an object.”34 
The court analyzed the statute in equal protection 
and due process terms and reached a similar verdict 
to the Arkansas Supreme Court decision. Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the state cannot make an 
adult’s private sexual conduct a crime and that the 
due process clause grants the right to engage in such 
conduct.35 The Supreme Court laid to rest all state 
sodomy laws criminalizing homosexual behavior and 
stated that the Founders “knew times can blind us to 
certain truths and later generations can see that laws 
once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only 
to oppress.”36
Land	of	Opportunity
The final section of  the book juxtaposes the 
development of  Eureka Springs, Arkansas, which 
served as both an escapist destination for many 
Southern homosexuals and the town’s evangelical 
tourist attraction, Gerald Smith’s, The Great Passion 
Play. The town, equipped with natural hot springs, 
first became an attraction in the 1890’s, post-
Reconstruction. However, by the 1960’s, as the 
mystical allure of  “hot springs” as places of  healing 
fell out of  fashion, the town of  Eureka Springs fell 
by the wayside. Thompson describes the entrance 
of  political figure Gerald Lyman Kenneth Smith, 
a devout Christian who built a 1,500 foot statute 
of  Christ on the outskirts of  town. Along with 
the statue, Smith constructed a Holy Land theme 
park with an amphitheater recreating the Passion 
of  the Christ story nightly. The play and the theme 
park reinvigorated the town, providing a thriving 
business community deep in the Ozark Mountains. 
The reinvention of  Eureka Springs and the natural 
remoteness of  the town, began to hold a new appeal 
for many gays and lesbians seeking a community far 
away from the rest of  society.
Thompson also begins the section with an 
analysis of  the rural lesbian separatist movement and 
the attempts by several women to find their own space 
in the Ozark Mountains by forming lesbian-centered 
communes. Both of  these narratives combine to 
depict the attempts by gay men and lesbian women 
to defy increasing societal rejection and create their 
own social constructs.
While Thompson provides a brief  history of  
prior attempts to self-select out of  modern society, 
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the many gays and lesbians who have tried to continue 
their lives within Southern society are still met with 
legalized discrimination. The 1968 Fair Housing Act 
provides no protection against discrimination on the 
basis of  sexual orientation.37 Only twelve states and 
the District of  Columbia prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of  sexual orientation and gender identity 
and six additional states prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of  sexual orientation only.38 Arkansas is not 
one of  those states.
Arkansas has also codified a ban on same-
sex marriages that reads: “Marriage shall be only 
between a man and a woman. A marriage between 
persons of  the same sex is void.”39 Connecticut, D.C., 
Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont 
are the only states that currently issue marriage 
licenses to same sex couples. 40 Maryland and New 
York recognize same-sex marriages performed legally 
in another state.41 A handful of  other states provide 
limited domestic partnership benefits to same sex 
couples, none of  which fall within even a broad 
definition of  the American South.42
Only twelve states and D.C. have laws 
prohibiting employment discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity. 43 Nine others 
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation 
only.44 None of  the states listed fall within the 
American South.
Through his depiction of  the dueling 
personalities of  Eureka Springs, Thompson 
examines the growing Southern evangelical culture 
and the growing social and economic power of  the 
gay movement. In this final section he addresses the 
appeal and benefits of  rural culture to many Southern 
gays and lesbians, as well as the rising tide of  bigotry 
and ostracism against them. While the history of  
the town of  Eureka Springs seems to provide a 
utopian glimpse of  a more tolerant American South, 
Thompson ends the book with a description of  his 
childhood minister’s snub during a town hall meeting. 
Home from a year of  graduate school in London, 
Thompson attended the town hall meeting on a 
resolution to ban the town from having a gay pride 
parade. He took the only seat available in the room, 
next to his childhood minister, who turned his back 
to Thompson and refused to say hello. While the fight 
for gay rights today seems to focus less on finding 
an isolated space for gay communities, in the face of  
the continued discrimination described above, it is 
not difficult to see why so many gay men and lesbian 
women once sought their own space.
As a whole, The Un–Natural State is 
Thompson’s attempt to combine his own history 
with Arkansas’ complicated queer past. The book is 
an homage to the unique space the American South 
provides to gays and lesbians. It is also an analysis of  
what it means to be a Southern gay man or woman 
and a critique of  the intolerance that continues to 
pervade modern Southern culture. As analyzed 
above, the law has both helped and hurt the gay rights 
movement, providing protection one minute and 
persecution the next. The Un–Natural State provides 
rich oral recollections and historical narratives to the 
controversial legal issues that still plague the on-going 
fight for gay civil rights.
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REFLECTIONS	OF	A	LAW	STUDENT	FROM	
THE	HIP	HOP	GENERATION
By Shailee Diwanji1
For an immigrant on the outside looking in, 
America is bright, shiny, new, and full of  optimism. 
America is the pot of  gold at the end of  the rainbow, 
brimming with hope and potential. It is, however, the 
pot of  gold he will never fi nd. Many immigrants in this 
country were forced to choose between the lesser of  two 
evils – corruption and oppression in their country or a 
muted version of  it here in America. Today, unfortunately, 
America is still a land where an African American medical 
student is pinned to the ground for the crime of  driving 
a Mercedes and where a prominent African American 
United States Attorney is charged with a crime he did 
not commit. To many, equality under American law is a 
distant dream. They call it “the new slaveocracy.” “Slavery 
was not abolished, it was polished,” they say. These are 
radical proclamations. However, considering ‘colored’ 
persons account for nearly two-thirds of  America’s prison 
population, the slogans lose some of  their radical luster. 
At the very least, dialogue is necessary. The international 
language of  Hip Hop facilitates that dialogue through a 
remarkable amalgam of  sound and engineering.
Paul Butler, Dean and Professor of  Law at George 
Washington University, addressed the intimate connection 
between Hip Hop and the criminal justice system in his 
Keynote Presentation at this year’s Roots and Reality II
symposium. “Hip hop is political,” he said, “but it is not 
united on any issue except for its critique of  the criminal 
justice system. America has used prison promiscuously. 
Today, there are more black men in prison than in college. 
Prison has lost its deterrent effect.” Hip Hop proffers three 
main ideas that form the foundation on which our criminal 
justice system should be built. First, people who harm 
others should be punished. Second, criminals deserve 
love and respect. And third, communities are destroyed 
by crime and by punishment. Given this foundation, it 
follows that judges, when sentencing, should consider the 
effect of  a sentence on other people in the community, just 
like prosecutors do before indicting a corporation.
Hip Hop, through its music, has broken 
barriers of  silence and started a dialogue on these vital 
issues. Hip Hop is, however, not free of  criticism. So 
that its creators may earn “street cred,” misogyny and 
hyper masculinity is pervasive in Hip Hop. Perhaps 
as a result, a black man is fourteen times more likely 
to be shot and a black woman is thirty-fi ve percent 
more likely to be physically assaulted. On the other 
hand, Hip Hop is not so different from other popular 
culture. Do we not see the same kind of  misogyny 
and hyper masculinity in movies, sports, and military 
culture too? Roots and Reality II juxtaposed the game-
changing power of  Hip Hop with its untenable 
misogyny. It offered a unique and interactive way 
for us students, die hard members of  the Hip Hop 
generation, to participate in this revolutionary, no, 
“resolutionary” dialogue about equality under the law.
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SYMPOSIUM	HIGHLIGHTS:	
WHAT,	EXACTLY,	IS	A	“POST-WHITE”	AMERICA?
By M. Coleen Wilson1
On March 23, 2011, The Modern American
hosted its annual Spring Symposium at American 
University Washington College of  Law. The 
symposium, entitled “Minority Majority: The Social 
and Legal Implications of  a Post-White America,” 
questioned the possibility of  a post-racial America. 
Minority groups are poised to become the majority in 
America by the year 2050, marking an end to nearly 
300 years of  a white majority. Moderated by Professor 
Pamela Bridgewater,2 the panel was comprised of  
Horace Cooper,3 Jumana Musa,4 and Professor Lia 
Epperson.5
The panelists started the discussion by 
analyzing the concept of  a “minority majority” and 
what it means to be “post-racial.” A symposium 
attendee proposed that the label “post-racial” is itself  
a fallacy, and asserted that modern conversations 
about race in America have become proxies for 
much-needed conversations about class. All the 
panelists agreed that discussions regarding race are 
not necessarily substitutes or diversions for dialogues 
about class.
Panelist Musa acknowledged the error in 
classifying America as “post-racial” merely because 
“the other” surpasses white Americans in population 
alone. Musa opined, racial and ethnic minorities in 
America have disparate experiences, viewing them 
collectively as a “supergroup” demeans their individual 
experiences. Professor Epperson suggested that these 
groups’ histories of  subordination necessitate a call 
for coalition-building.
The panel also discussed how other societies 
have dealt with such changes throughout history 
in order to gauge how Americans will react to this 
change. Parallels were drawn between South Africa 
and the United States, with the panelists agreeing that 
America’s unique history makes this current crossroads 
inherently different. This acknowledgment prompted 
one symposium attendee to question whether there 
is any merit to the argument that a White majority 
is needed to hold America together by acting as an 
“ethnic referee” and keeper of  the peace. Panelist 
Musa dismissed this assertion, stating that this belief  
is based on the false perception of  there being only 
one type of  white American, much like racial and 
ethnic minorities do not have one cohesive identity.
The program quickly turned to a discussion 
on the need for social programs in a post-racial 
America. A symposium attendee voiced her concerns 
about using the “myth of  a post-racial America” 
as a tool to discontinue programs and policies that 
were established to counteract the effects of  social 
disparities.
The panel closed on a pensive note with 
one symposium attendee noting that, while it is 
debatable whether we are on a trajectory toward a 
post-racial America, at least we are all privileged to 
have a voice in an era where being “post-racial” is 
even a possibility.
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